

THE OPEN DOOR: U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
FROM 1787 TO 2008

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Strategy

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ABSTRACT

THE OPEN DOOR: U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 1787-2008, by MAJ Patrick S. Daulton,
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The grand strategy of the United States is that of the Open Door. Since 1787, the END of U.S. grand strategy have remained constant--to achieve the purpose laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution. For the last two-hundred twenty years the WAYS and MEANS available to achieve that ENDS have grown, and with each major evolution in WAYS and MEANS the grand strategy of the United States has evolved. From neutrality to regional power to superpower, U.S. grand strategy has been expansionist in nature, yet in keeping with the values and national purpose of the United States. That expansion has ensured American security from threats abroad and prosperity at home. The Command and General Staff College should expand the instruction given in C200 "Strategic Concepts" with a discussion of U.S. grand strategy and its relationship to national values and interests.

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For SGT. Brock A. Babb, United States Marine Corps. Killed In Action 15 October 2006, Al Anbar, Iraq; and for his family. One of the many things that distinguish these United States from the transient powers that have gone before her is that we have no lost causes. There is a plan, and what we do every day is a part of it.

What we do here echoes in eternity.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
DIME	The four Instruments of National Power- Diplomatic, Informational, Military & Economic.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
US	United States
USG	United States Government
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the past millennia, nation-states and empires have adopted various grand strategies in their bids at dominating the international geopolitical system. COL J.A. Bassani, in his work *Saving the World for Democracy*, points to two classic examples of grand strategic planning in his discussion of the Roman and British Empires. The Roman Empire, in its quest for security and prosperity, adopted a grand strategy that centered on client states. A thousand years later, the British Empire adopted a grand strategy that relied on using the Empire's considerable navy, as well as trade and diplomatic ties, to maintain a multi-polar balance of power among the monarchies of Europe.¹ In both cases, these great powers adopted grand strategies that, at their ends, aimed at security and prosperity.

The grand strategy of the United States also has the security and prosperity of its citizens in mind. The founding fathers, based on their vision for the Republic they were creating, wrote this purpose in the preamble to the Constitution:

We the people, of the United States of America, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility and provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.²

These twin imperatives of security and prosperity have guided the foreign policy of the United States since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. The evidence of U.S. grand strategy is readily apparent. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review,

¹ J.A. Bassani Jr. "Saving the World for Democracy" (Master's Thesis: Joint Forces Staff College. 2005.)

² The United States Constitution. Preamble.

completed during the Clinton administration, stated that the United States' fundamental goals were to "protect Americans... and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation."³ President George W. Bush's introduction to the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) also emphasized the security and prosperity of the nation. President Bush wrote, "We chose... the pursuit of free trade and open markets... [W]e fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country."⁴ The similarity of these two statements is remarkable, given the differences between the two presidents.

President Clinton was a Democrat and author of the Clinton Doctrine of selective interventionism.⁵ President George W. Bush was Republican, and the author of the Preemption Doctrine.⁶ That two Presidents with such dramatically different administrations share the same fundamental priorities indicates that the safety and prosperity of Americans transcends partisan politics and the variances in administrations. That common linkage between the Constitution and two very different Presidents, two and a quarter centuries distant from that document's ratification, offers perhaps an insight into the grand strategy of the United States. The development of that hypothesis requires a definition of grand strategy before the specific grand strategy of the United States, and how that grand strategy applies to the current National Security Organization, can be explored.

³ U.S. Government, *1997 Quadrennial Defense Review* (U.S. Government, Washington, D.C. 1997), sect. III.

⁴ U.S. Government, *2006 National Security Strategy* (U.S. Government, Washington, D.C. 2006), 1.

⁵ We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. *But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so* [emphasis added]. President Clinton, 26 February 1999.

⁶ The Bush Doctrine of preemption first appeared in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The 2006 Bush National Security Strategy updated the verbiage to read, "To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense."⁶ U.S. Government, *2006 National Security Strategy* (U.S. Government, Washington, D.C. 2006) iv.

Grand strategy, broadly defined, is a combination of a nation's vital interests, its national purpose, and the future that nation desires to create for itself. But what exactly is the grand strategy of the United States? In order to answer this question, this paper reviews the most prevalent thought on grand strategy and from those writings frames a general definition of what constitutes grand strategy. After establishing a common frame of reference for the term, this paper presents a hypothesis that seeks to explain the grand strategy of the United States. This paper uses the evolution of U.S. grand strategy from 1787 (the signing of the Constitution) to 1941 as a vehicle to demonstrate the current U.S. grand strategy.

U.S. grand strategy is not found in a single document. Several noted authors, from Paul Kennedy to John Mearsheimer, have established that other great powers have had grand strategies throughout centuries of successful hegemonic leadership. Much like the grand strategy of the United States, those great powers pursued a grand strategy that was intentionally broad and flexible. Neither the Roman, the Mongol nor the Spanish Empires wrote their grand strategies in a single document. Yet writers have established several times that each of those empires had a grand strategy.⁷

Grand strategies, by their nature, are broad and inclusive of all the resources and instruments of power a state can bring to bear. In defining what grand strategy is, it is important to first separate grand strategy from strategy. Samuel P. Huntington noted this separation when he wrote in his important work *The Soldier and the State*, "Politics deals

⁷ For excellent discussions on the grand strategies of hegemonic powers, see John J. Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* and Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1989).

with the goals of state policy....[It] is beyond the scope of military competence.”⁸

Strategy and the military art, therefore, are the domains of the soldier, while grand strategies and policies are the domain of the statesman.

One of the best-known Western military philosophers was Carl von Clausewitz. In his seminal work *On War* Clausewitz wrote, “War is an extension of politics by other means” and defined strategy as “the combination of individual engagements to attain the goal of the campaign or war.”⁹ Clausewitz further differentiated strategy from tactics when he wrote, “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of war.”¹⁰ Here, Clausewitz offered his first definition of strategy, and the definition that is most often attributed to his writings. However, Clausewitz did not stop with this definition. In his chapter “The Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made,” Clausewitz expanded his discussion of policy making to describe it as, “an art in the broadest meaning of the term--the faculty of using judgment to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations.”¹¹ Taken together, these two definitions—war as an extension of policy and policy as a broad art—indicate strongly that Clausewitz had an appreciation of grand strategy that extended well beyond the battlefield.

Antoine Henri Jomini also linked policy and military action. The first section of Jomini’s *Summary of the Art of War*, titled *Statesmanship in Relation to War* was a primer

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 71.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Roots of Strategy Volume 2, The Most Important Principles for the Conduct of War* translated by, Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1985), 349.

¹⁰ von Clausewitz, *On War* translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 146.

¹¹ Clausewitz, 153.

on the relationship between foreign policy and the military arm. Jomni wrote, “A statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of war.”¹² Jomni also offered a proscriptive formula for the policy maker.¹³

Noted British strategist B.H. Liddell-Hart in his well-known work, *Strategy*, provided one of the most comprehensive definitions of grand strategy available when he wrote that a proper grand strategy will “coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of war.”¹⁴ Liddell-Hart was one of the first modern writers on the subject of grand strategy to encapsulate all the instruments of national power into the discussion when he wrote,

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources—for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure of commercial pressure, and not the least, of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will.¹⁵

As thorough as Liddell-Hart’s conceptualization of grand strategy was, his limitation of grand strategy as a wartime endeavor rendered it incomplete. Liddell-Hart’s definition incorporated all of a nation’s instruments of national power in war, but lacked two

¹² Antoine Henri Jomni, *Summary of the Art of War*, translated by Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle, USMC (Ret.), (Harrisburg: Stackpole. 1985,) 439.

¹³ Ibid., 439-446.

¹⁴ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), 322.

¹⁵ Ibid.

important elements by not expanding that definition to include peace and a desire to shape the future.

Paul Kennedy, professor of history at Yale and noted author and columnist, added a detail that Liddell-Hart missed when he wrote, “the crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term best interests.”¹⁶ Kennedy’s incorporation of all the elements of a nation’s power, in war and in peace, to realize those long-term best interests was the most satisfying definition encountered in general literature so far.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, strategist, author and columnist, offered a similar, broad definition when he defined grand strategy as “a vision of a desirable future world and your country's favorable position therein, plus a plan to get there that logically employs your nation's available resources.”¹⁷ Barnett’s inclusion of all a nation’s available resources supported Kennedy’s discussion of military and nonmilitary elements. By defining grand strategy as a vision of a desirable future, Barnett agreed with Kennedy’s inclusion of long-term best interests as part of a grand strategy.

The U.S. Army War College put forward its own definition of grand strategy:

Grand strategy is defined as the product of national purpose—a nation’s beliefs, ethics and vision—and its national interest. National purpose is the start point for the entire process. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the national purpose represent the legal, philosophical and moral basis for continuation of the American system. From the nation’s purpose, as well as an understanding of the nation’s domestic and global

¹⁶ Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 5.

¹⁷ Thomas P.M. Barnett, “Realigning America’s Grand Strategy,” *Knoxville News Sentinel*, 17 February 2008.

needs, the [nation] derives its enduring core national interests in the grand strategic appraisal process.¹⁸

This example supported Kennedy and Barnett's definitions by linking national interest and vision. However, the War College definition placed significant importance on national purpose. The concept that grand strategy began and ended with the national purpose was a trait of grand strategy that Liddell-Hart touched on in his definition when he wrote of moral resources and ethical pressure.¹⁹

Taking these definitions into account, the general definition of grand strategy forwarded here is: grand strategy is the combination of national purpose and interests that uses all elements of a nation's power to bring about more advantageous future conditions for that nation. Using this definition of grand strategy in a theoretical sense, the next step is to determine how this definition applies in practice to U.S. grand strategy. A preliminary definition of U.S. grand strategy is 'a combination of U.S. national purpose and U.S. interests that takes into account all the elements of U.S. national power to bring about more advantageous future conditions for the United States.' This definition, however, is too broad. Simply applying the general definition of grand strategy and changing 'nation' to 'U.S.' does not adequately encapsulate what exactly U.S. national purpose and interests really are. Any specific description of U.S. grand strategy requires a practical knowledge of U.S. national purpose and interests.

Chapter 2 explores the concepts of national purpose and interests as they specifically apply to the United States, in order to arrive at a more specific, and therefore

¹⁸J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 2007.), C202-RE-2.

¹⁹ Ibid., C202-RE-3.

testable, hypothesis of U.S. grand strategy. Chapter 3 details the methodology used in the analysis and testing of this hypothesis. Chapter 4 uses that methodology to analyze U.S. foreign policy from 1787 until 1941—from the ratification of the Constitution to just prior to U.S. involvement in World War II—to demonstrate a pattern of expansion. Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis by focusing on what really made the United States a super power after World War II. Chapter 6 concludes the argument on U.S. grand strategy and Chapter 7 ends the paper with recommendations for the Army's Command and General Staff Officers Course on modifying and updating the curriculum to reflect the results of this research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical basis that this paper uses for describing strategic design is the Lykke model. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., a professor at the U.S. Army War College, described strategic design as being composed of ends, ways and means, balanced against risk. H. Richard Yarger in “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model” wrote “Art Lykke gave coherent form to a theory of strategy with his articulation of the three-legged stool model of strategy which illustrated that strategy = ends + ways + means and if these were not in balance the assumption of greater risk.”²⁰ The Lykke model was specifically selected because it represented the current industry standard in strategic theory. Both the Army’s Command and General Staff College and the Army War College used the Lykke model for instruction on strategic theory.²¹ The author acknowledges that this theory has not gained universal acceptance, but absent a government-wide format for strategic design, Lykke’s formula translates readily, though not exactly, to the phrasing of National Security objectives in the 2006 NSS to serve as a model for discussion.²²

The United States, in 2008, has a well-developed National Security Organization. The National Security Act of 1947, as Sam Sarkasian wrote in *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, “[e]stablished the basis for integrating political,

²⁰ Richard H. Yarger, *Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model* (Carlisle: USAWC, 1992), 2.

²¹ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “Advance Sheet for Lesson C202 Strategic Concepts” (Leavenworth: USACGSC, 2007), 1.

²² The 2006 NSS uses broader terminology by dividing its guidance into “Explaining the Goal,” which equates to the ends in the Lykke model, and “How we will achieve the goal,” which is sufficiently broad as to include both ways and means in each discussion.

military, and intelligence functions into the national security policy process, thereby giving the president a structure for a systematized assessment of policy and strategic options [sic].”²³ A 1949 amendment modified the original act, as did the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The National Security Organization reached its present form with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (and Amendments). The current National Security Structure displayed in Figure 1-1 is the results of these laws.²⁴




Figure 1. Current National Security Organization.
Source: USACGSC 2008.

Just as the National Security Organization is the result of public law, so is the U.S. process of designing and authoring strategy. Also mandated by the 1949 National

²³ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 2002), 93.

²⁴ The discussion here is focused on the strategy developing apparatus of the United States. For that reason, many of the details of the National Security Act, the Defense Reorganization Act, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act are not addressed here.

Security Act is the requirement for the President to author and present to Congress a National Security Strategy. An amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, sponsored by John Warner and William Whitehurst, reinforced the requirement for a National Security Strategy (NSS).²⁵

As Figure 1 reflects, the National Security Organization is headed by the President. When the President publishes his annual NSS, that document contains strategic guidance that applies to each member of the Executive Departments (State, Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community).²⁶ Each of the Executive Departments, in turn publish their own strategies, nesting the goals and priorities of their respective departments with the overall way ahead prescribed by the NSS. Joint doctrine refers to this process as “unified action,” and defines it as “the coordination across all branches and departments of the U.S. Government (USG).”²⁷ While joint doctrine has no regulatory bearing on any Executive Department but the Department of Defense, unified action is a serviceable description of the process of nesting that occurs. Yarger, in his recently published monograph *The Little Book of Big Strategy*, also noted that strategy is hierarchal when he wrote, “Strategy cascades from the national level down to lower levels.”²⁸

Figure 2 indicates Yarger’s conception of hierarchal strategies in the U.S. structure. Significant here is that the National Security Strategy, which is the most senior

²⁵ United States. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington DC: GPO, 1986), Public Law 99-433.

²⁶ The NSS does not make use of the traditional “Responsibilities” subheadings that are the staple of military policies and regulations; rather the text prescribes broad statements of intent that the executive departments use as the basis for their supporting strategies.

²⁷ U.S. Government, *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C. USG Printing Office, 2007) I-12-13.

²⁸ H. Richard Yarger, *The Little Book of Big Strategy* (Carlisle: USAWC, 2006), 10.

printed document on U.S. strategy, occupies a middle-ranked spot in the U.S. strategic hierarchy.




Figure 2. Comprehensive Strategy with Hierarchical Design.
Source: H. Richard Yarger, *The Little Book of Big Strategy*

A major contention of this paper is that the grand strategy of the United States, though unpublished and not codified in any one document, represents a form of strategic thought that supersedes the NSS. Yarger’s diagram supports this position. Yarger further noted, “Grand strategy may be written or unwritten.”²⁹ However, grand strategy is second only to national interests in a hierarchical strategic design (figure 2). While that grand strategy

²⁹ Ibid, 11.

certainly may take any form, an unpublished grand strategy in a system that otherwise demands unified action³⁰ creates problems.

Absent a published U.S. grand strategy, it is difficult to develop long-range strategies, or to find a doctrinal basis for balancing short and mid-term strategic gains with anticipated long-term grand strategic interests. The NSS addresses the national interests and the ways and means to secure those interests, but only in the short term. Given that the NSS is an annual report, and a statement of “no change” may be submitted in lieu of a new report every year, it is difficult to see how the NSS incorporates the long range planning inherent in a grand strategy.³¹

Additionally, that lack of a coherent grand strategy has created a commonly held perception that the United States has no grand strategy, that instead our national direction is determined four to eight years at a time, continuously reinterpreted and redirected year to year, and drastically revised as presidential administrations change hands. Aaron Friedberg expressed a similar judgment in 1982: “the United States has had a strategic doctrine in the same way a schizophrenic has a personality. Instead of a single integrated and integrating set of ideas, values and beliefs, we have a complex and sometimes contradictory mélange of notions, principles, and policies.”³² Actually, nothing could be further from the truth.

The case this paper makes is that the current grand strategy of the United States is the Open Door. The definition of the grand strategy of the Open Door is “the use of all the elements of U.S. national power to defend the core political and economic interests of

³⁰ JP 1, I-13.

³¹ The 2002 National Security Strategy was resubmitted in 2003, 2004, and 2005 as a “no change.”

³² Aaron Friedberg, *The Strategic Imperative* (Boston: Ballinger Press. 1982), 56.

the United States, and ensure security and prosperity of its citizens through domination of the international system.” The Open Door is a grand strategy based on the belief that the surest way to guarantee the safety and prosperity of Americans is for the United States to dominate the world politically, militarily and economically. However, the Open Door is not an American version of eighteenth century British mercantilism, and it is not the “military stick and a dollar carrot” that Sidney Lens, in his work *The Forging of the American Empire*, charged was used to “forge an imperialist empire.”³³ The grand strategy of the Open Door has at its core the belief that security rests in global hegemony, but within that grand strategy are several uniquely American ideals, among them the Wilsonian vision of making the world safe for democracy and the defense of domestic core values.³⁴

The Open Door explanation of American grand strategy borrows its name from Secretary of State John Hay’s *Open Door Notes*.³⁵ The late University of Wisconsin Professor William Appleman Williams later used Hay’s words, Open Door, when he wrote *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* in 1959. According to Williams, “the open door outlook was based on an economic definition of the world... [With the] United States seeking world power as a trustee for civilization.”³⁶ Williams expounded on that theory again in 1980 in *Empire as a Way of Life* when he wrote, “President Roosevelt

³³ Sidney Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire From Revolution to Vietnam: A History of U.S. Imperialism* (Sterling: Pluto Press, 1971), xii.

³⁴ The Wilsonian vision of making the World Safe for Democracy and the separate issue, the defense of domestic core values, are explained in detail in chapter 2.

³⁵ Williams’ version of the Open Door has some elements in common with the Open Door policy to China, but the two should not be confused. For the purposes of this paper, the Grand strategy of the Open Door (hereafter, “Open Door”) refers to the William Appleman Williams school of thought.

³⁶ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: World Publishing, 1959), 229.

proposed to wage [the Second World War] as cheaply as possible and with the least possible disruption of domestic life and society... thus realizing America's global dream of an open world marketplace dominated by American power.”³⁷

The theory of the Open Door as the grand strategy of the United States was not Williams' alone. His work gained widespread acceptance after the publication of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* in 1959. This general acceptance led to a collection of related essays from other leading political scientists and historians, including historians Walter LeFeber, Richard W. Van Alstyne, Edward P. Crapol, Howard Schonberger, Loyd Gardner, Robert Freeman Smith, and Henry W. Berger. Each of these contributing individuals was already a noted member of the academy in his own right; together they became known as the Williams school of thought on American Foreign Policy. His work *From Colony to Empire* further detailed the evolution of the Open Door as the grand strategy of the United States by closely examining American foreign policy throughout westward expansion.³⁸

Williams and his school of thought are not the only adherents to the Open Door theory of U.S. grand strategy. Since it was first introduced in 1959, numerous historians, political scientists and economists have revisited the theory of the Open Door as a U.S. grand strategy. In 1990, more than three decades after Williams first put forth the Open Door theory, G. Jonn Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan wrote that the successful rehabilitation of post-WWII Europe and the modern financial world order “had long

³⁷ William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 170.

³⁸ Williams, ed. *From Colony to Empire: Essays in The History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, NY. John Wiley and Sons, 1972), 2.

historical roots that could be traced to John Hay's Open Door."³⁹ Walter Russell Mead continued this theme in 2001 when he described the commercial tradition of American foreign policy in *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*.⁴⁰ The importance of the Open Door was similarly reflected by Michael Mandelbaum in his 2003 work *The Ideas that Conquered the World*, when he wrote of the "triumph of the market."⁴¹

Most recently, Christopher Layne wrote extensively on the Open Door as the grand strategy of the United States in his important 2006 work, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Layne's explanation of the Open Door as the grand strategy of the United States is simple. He wrote, "The story of American grand strategy over the past six decades is one of expansion."⁴² Layne built on the earlier works of Williams and the Williams school to make the following points:

- The United States is a global hegemon. That is, it is the preeminent nation-state on Earth and the only one capable of projecting its will across the globe.
- Since the 1940s the U.S. has sought to create a unipolar world order with itself as the sole power.
- The U.S. has maintained a military presence overseas to ensure that the international system does not lapse backward, into the multi-polar world of great powers that led to the two World Wars.⁴³

The Open Door belief is that the United States has sought to create a unipolar international system that would allow it to achieve the three grand strategic objectives of

³⁹ David P. Rapkin ed. *World Leadership and Hegemony Legitimation of Hegemonic Power* by G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan (Boulder: Lynne-Rienner, 1990), 61.

⁴⁰ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 105-112.

⁴¹ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered The World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 286-304.

⁴² Layne, 3.

⁴³ Ibid, 56.

“preserving American security, bolstering American economic prosperity, and promoting American values” that the U.S. Army War College model of strategy teaches.⁴⁴

What differentiates this paper from the works of the Williams and Layne is scope. Williams’ analysis of the Open Door was a critical analysis of individual policies; he did not connect individual policies to grand strategic trends. Layne’s work made the case that U.S. grand strategy is the Open Door, but his analysis began at the end of World War II. The case that this paper makes, by examining the evolution of U.S. foreign policy from 1787 through 1941, is that the great foreign policy shifts in U.S. history are the evolutionary ancestors of the grand strategy of the Open Door. Neutrality, the Monroe Doctrine, and Wilsonian Democracy each propelled the United States closer and closer to a position of worldwide dominance that has culminated—so far—in the current grand strategy of the Open Door.

⁴⁴Bartholomees, C202RE-2.




Figure 3. Strategy Map

Source: adapted from Christopher Layne's *Peace of Illusions*, p.14.

The use of the Open Door theory as an explanation makes the best sense of the facts available. Despite strong isolationist tendencies, the United States has been an expansionist society since its establishment.⁴⁵ The United States emerged from World War II as the preeminent economic and military power in the world. Expansionist from the start, the U.S. economy has dominated worldwide markets since at least the end of World War II. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, no peer competitors have emerged to

⁴⁵ The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 was America's first experience with neutrality & isolationism, but the concept remained a part of American beliefs up through the U.S. entry into World War I. President Woodrow Wilson was reelected in the 1916 campaign on the platform, "He kept us out of war."

challenge U.S. primacy, yet since that time Cold War treaty arrangements, particularly NATO, have continued to thrive and expand beyond their original charter.

Obviously the how and why of each of these facts is open to a wide variety of interpretations, and it is not a contention of this paper that every single occurrence in U.S. history is a step in a master plan. Rather, this paper contends that the best available interpretation of the facts coincides with Williams' Open Door. The Open Door offers a far more realistic interpretation of American expansion than does the theory of the "incoherent empire" that Michael Mann, in his book of the same title, advanced when he wrote, "The American Empire [is] a disturbed, misshapen monster stumbling clumsily across the world."⁴⁶ The pace of U.S. expansion over the last two centuries may have varied based on the policies of individual presidents, but the expansion itself has not been random.

Political scientists acknowledge three schools of political academic theory, or thought (hereafter referred to as schools of thought), as having been influential in the evolution of American grand strategy. These three schools of thought, as political scientist Stephen M. Walt described in *One World, Many Theories*, began as academic theories about the workings of the international system. Over time, these academic theories gained sufficient followers to be translated into practical use in the making of policy. The three schools of thought are liberal internationalism, liberal utopianism, and realism.⁴⁷

A liberal political theorist (either liberal internationalist or liberal utopian, regardless) is one that believes self-governed, democratic nations are superior forms of

⁴⁶ Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (New York: Verso. 2003), 13.

⁴⁷ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2004, 52.

government and inherently more stable internally and less dangerous externally.⁴⁸ Tony Smith, senior research associate for European Studies at Harvard University, noted that liberalism in its two major forms has a rich history in American political thought. Smith noted,

The American idea of a world order opposed to imperialism and composed of independent, self-determining, preferably democratic states bound together through international organizations dedicated to the peaceful handling of conflicts, free trade, and mutual defense (a package of proposals that may be called liberal democratic internationalism) has been with us in mature form since the early 1940s.⁴⁹

Within liberal thought are the two theories of liberal internationalist and liberal utopian thought.

Liberal internationalists believe that the United States should pursue its security goals by promoting a liberal world order. The reasoning behind that view is that a world of many small nation states is less dangerous to the United States than a world of larger, more capable ones. At the core of the liberal internationalist school of thought are the twin beliefs that the United States should not intervene in the affairs of other nations, and that all nations are entitled to self-determination.⁵⁰ The liberal internationalist view is the “thousand points of light” that President George Herbert Walker Bush described in his inaugural address when he said,

America today is a proud, free nation, decent and civil, a place we cannot help but love. We know in our hearts, not loudly and proudly, but as a simple fact... our strength is a force for good. No President, no government, can teach us to remember what is best in what we are...

⁴⁸ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and free markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs Publishing, 2002), 11.

⁴⁹ Tony Smith, *America's Mission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 7.

⁵⁰ Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2004, 52.

America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle.⁵¹

Snyder noted that liberal internationalism was so widely ascribed to in American politics that “the entire U.S. political spectrum” incorporated elements of liberal internationalism.⁵²

For liberal internationalists, the grand strategic end state laid down in the Constitution, “provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare” has remained the same since 1787. The ways and means applied to reach that end are what has changed. Walter Russell Meade, in his work *Special Providence*, demonstrated liberal internationalist thought. Meade noted that throughout American history, strategic priorities have changed and evolved.⁵³

At times, the United States has regarded a strong alliance between government and big business as essential. At others times, America’s mission has been interpreted as the spreading of American democratic values throughout the world. At still other times, the United States has interpreted its mission as the safeguarding of its liberties and prosperity at home. Sometimes, physical security and economic well-being of the American people were the priority.⁵⁴

Meade’s argument here encapsulated the liberal internationalist view that the grand strategy of the United States has remained relevant by evolving to fit circumstances as they developed.

⁵¹ Inaugural address of George Bush, 20 January 1989.

⁵² Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2004, 55.

⁵³ Russell Meade, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 5.

⁵⁴ Ibid, xvii.

Scholars and policymakers of the liberal internationalist school do not dispute the charge that at times, American policy has stumbled. However, they hold that in the words of Walter McDougall,

The United States, despite occasional funks and lapses, has struggled to acquit itself abroad in a more high-minded fashion than the imperial monarchies of the nineteenth century or dictatorships of the twentieth. [Throughout its history] the United States weighed in on the side of human dignity, progress, and liberty.⁵⁵

This belief was best embodied by the Wilsonian sense of mission that its namesake, President Wilson, espoused in his speech *Making the World Safe for Democracy*.⁵⁶ Democracy, according to liberal internationalist belief, is what enables security.⁵⁷

The school of political thought known as liberal utopianism is different from liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalists believe that security enables democracy. Liberal utopians believe democracy enables security. Liberal utopianism comes in two variants, liberal peace theory and democratic peace theory. William Appleman Williams, the founder of the open door theory of grand strategy, writes primarily from a liberal utopian perspective.

The other liberal utopian school is the democratic peace theory, which is the belief that liberal democracies are, as Lind wrote “inherently nonaggressive and that democracies will never go to war with one another.”⁵⁸ Though this sounds much like liberal internationalism, liberal democratic peace theory still falls under the liberal

⁵⁵ Walter McDougall, *Promised Land Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997), 2-3.

⁵⁶ Making the World Safe for Democracy, President Woodrow Wilson asks Congress for a declaration of war against Germany, April 1917.

⁵⁷ Snyder, 54.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

utopian school because its core principle is that democracy enables security. Closely related is the second sub-discipline of the liberal utopian school, liberal peace theory, which is the concept of a world order that is so interconnected and interdependent that state-on-state warfare becomes unthinkable.⁵⁹

Finally, there is the realist school of thought, also known as conservative thought. Members of the realist school believe that “[s]elf interested states compete for power and security.”⁶⁰ Christopher Layne described realist views as the practical, if sometimes regrettable, actions of a superpower that is bent on remaining a global superpower. “The story of American grand strategy over the past six decades is one of expansion, and that strategy’s logic inexorably has driven the United States to attempt to establish its hegemony.”⁶¹ Political scientist and author John J. Mearsheimer echoed Layne’s depiction of realist statecraft when he wrote, “The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of the competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power [sic].”⁶² As each of these authors indicated, the core of realist theory is that states are the main actors in the international system. Those states compete with one another for power and security using diplomacy and military power as their two main instruments.⁶³

⁵⁹ Lind, 35.

⁶⁰ McDougall, 26-40.

⁶¹ Christopher Layne, *Peace of Illusions: American Grand strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 3.

⁶² John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 3.

⁶³ Snyder, 7.

Mearsheimer, Lind, Layne, Kennedy, Gray and Addington all belong to the realist school. These notable authors differ on some points—whether the United States is a regional power with global influence or a fully global hegemon, for example — but share the same practical view of power politics. While the world needs liberals and utopians to round it out, realists will argue that at the end of the day, danger still lurks.

The three different perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Many realists pursue liberal democratic policies. Liberal utopian presidents, despite their individual beliefs, still have to operate in a thoroughly realist world. President George W. Bush, on the eve of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, intertwined all three acknowledged schools of thought in two sentences. In his 2003 State of the Union address when he said, “We have the duty [as liberal utopians] to reform domestic programs vital to our country; we have the opportunity [also as liberal internationalists] to save millions of lives abroad from a terrible disease. We will [as both liberal utopians and liberal internationalists] work for a prosperity that is broadly shared, and [as realists] we will answer every danger and every enemy that threatens the American people.”⁶⁴ President Bush’s remarks illustrated the often contradictory nature of American policy.

McDougall made the point that “confusion and discord have been the norm in American politics not because we lack principles to guide us but because we have canonized so many... that we are pulled every which way at once.”⁶⁵ This complex interweaving of disciplines and perspectives is more than just a mincing of political catchphrases or the recipe for lively debates. These widely skewed perspectives, the

⁶⁴ White House Press Release, 28 January 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html> October 21, 2008.

⁶⁵ McDougall, 4.

internationalist, the utopian and the realist, are all inherent parts of the grand strategy of the United States. Walt noted that despite their differences, the three major theoretical schools of thought do have common ground. “Most realists recognize that... domestic factors are important; liberals acknowledge that power is central to international behavior and [liberal utopians] admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states.”⁶⁶

Understanding the three major American schools of liberal internationalism, liberal utopianism and realism is critical to understanding American foreign policy and grand strategy. As Professor Stephen M. Walt, master of the University of Chicago’s social science collegiate division, wrote in *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*, “there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy.”⁶⁷ Perspective, here used to describe the political theory that an individual ascribes to, determines to some extent how a policy maker interprets and reacts to the actions of other states. In a 2005 interview, Robert Jervis, professor of international relations at Columbia University, noted, “What we call the security dilemma, where one country increases its power and makes others less secure,” is a result of policy makers’ conflicting perspectives.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1998, 43.

⁶⁷ Walt.

⁶⁸ Robert Jervis, “A Conversation with Robert Jervis,” Interview at U.C. Berkley, 17 NOV 2005.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The grand strategy of the Open Door is a combination of economic and foreign policies, and core domestic values. World leadership, primarily through economic leadership backed by military supremacy and foreign policies that support the growth of democratic institutions in other nations, is the ultimate guarantee of liberty and prosperity for the American people. Because the Open Door is not encapsulated in a single document, it is necessary to assess the events, policies and leaders that have directly shaped U.S. grand strategy.

Comparison is an analysis technique used by political and social scientists to determine patterns of actions. Todd Landman, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government at the University of Essex and Deputy Director of the Human Rights Centre explained the logic of this methodology in his primer, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*. There are four steps in the comparison technique: contextual description, classification, hypothesis testing and conclusion. These four steps, Landman noted, “co-exist and are mutually reinforcing.”⁶⁹

Several significant political scientists, journalists and historians have made use of the comparison technique when analyzing foreign policies. Paul Kennedy, in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, used the comparison technique to analyze the circumstances that have enabled regional powers to become great powers in the international system. Kennedy analyzed Ming China, the Ottoman Empire, the Mogul Empire, Tokugawa Japan and west-central Europe from a known point in time, the year

⁶⁹ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 4.

1500. The events that Kennedy analyzed to arrive at his conclusions are technological change, military competitiveness, and “tracing the changes which have occurred in the global economic balances since 1500.”⁷⁰

John Mearsheimer made similar use of the comparison technique in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* when he examined the foreign policy practices of Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. Like Kennedy’s work, this paper examines a broad period of time rather than focusing on the policy and motivations behind any one president or doctrine.⁷¹ This broad perspective—from 1787 to 1941— will demonstrate a pattern of U.S. policies that corroborates the hypothesis of the Open Door.

William Bundy also used the comparison technique in his collection of essays, *Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy*. Bundy and the individual essay authors used the comparison technique to start from known points—in their case, the American bicentennial-- and look backward.⁷² Often, the result of the comparison technique was a narrative or chronology that started at one point in time and led the reader forward, either to a specific stopping point or to the present day. Gordon A. Craig, one of Bundy’s essayists, used the chronological narrative as a means of presenting data that he analyzed using the comparison technique when he wrote “The United States and the European Balance.”⁷³

⁷⁰ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), xv-xviii.

⁷¹ Mearsheimer, 169.

⁷² William P. Bundy, ed. *Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy* (New York: New York University Press, 1977.) Collection of seven different essays that analyze the development of U.S. regional foreign policies.

⁷³ Gordon Craig, Professor of Humanities at Stanford University and author of *The United States and the European Balance* (the third essay in Bundy’s collection) makes use of the chronological narrative,

This paper utilizes the comparison technique to analyze U.S. grand strategy. The first step in comparison is contextual description. Landman defined this first step as the “process of describing the political phenomena and events.”⁷⁴ Beginning with the first of America’s foreign policies, Washington’s policy of neutrality, this paper will contextually describe major American foreign policies. A policy of neutrality, by itself, would contraindicate any aspirations of becoming a global power. Contextually, this grand strategy was logical given the United State’s limited military capability and its young institutions. George Washington’s policy of neutrality was an expression of that limited capability. However, only a few decades later, President Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine, effectively laying claim to the entire Western Hemisphere. What was the basis for this sudden, and potentially inflammatory, policy change? Chapter 4 also notes several other evolutionary points in U.S. grand strategy, including the shift from the Monroe Doctrine to Wilsonian Democracy in 1917 and the similar major policy shift that occurred immediately prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, with the repealing of the Neutrality Acts in March of 1941.⁷⁵ In each case, contextual description is the basis for the analysis that follows.

The second step in the comparison technique is classification. Classification is a means of “cognitive simplification in order to group vast numbers of... events into distinct categories with identifiable and shared characteristics.”⁷⁶ The process of examining the evolution of U.S. grand strategy from 1787 to 1941 lends itself to

starting his essay with the negotiations leading up to the Adams-Onis treaty in 1828 and ending with remarks made by Henry Kissinger in June of 1976.

⁷⁴ Landman, 5.

⁷⁵ David G. Delaney *Neutrality Acts* (USA: Macmillan Reference 2004.) [database online]; available from http://www.novelguide.com/a/discover/mac_03/mac_03_00231.html

⁷⁶ Ibid., 5.

classification. Examining every single occurrence in the past two hundred-twenty years is impossible; therefore, the data compared in this thesis is limited to specific areas that give insight into American grand strategic thought. These areas are presidential doctrines and U.S. foreign policies, treaties and alliances, and U.S. military actions 1787 to 1941.

The first area, presidential doctrines & U.S. foreign policies, is perhaps the best indicator of grand strategic design available, absent a written grand strategy. Doctrines and policies are excellent indicators of U.S. grand strategic thought. Often these doctrines and policies immediately pre-date other actions, although in at least one case, Jackson's raid into Florida which was followed by the Monroe Doctrine, the reverse is true. The thoughts and words of our presidents offered many of the best insights into American grand strategic thought. To further add detail, this paper examines specific primary literature, the actual speeches and writings of presidents and their key advisors, when available.

The second area that this paper looks for is U.S. participation in treaties and alliances. Americans have a strong tradition of avoiding overseas alliances and of acting unilaterally. Therefore, the specific instances where the United States has committed its prestige, and potentially its blood and treasure, to an alliance or other treaty are significant. Not all treaties and alliances are equal. Categorizing overseas agreements into either military or economic treaties adds a deeper level of analysis than just confirming the existence of a given agreement. Within the narrower scope of military treaties or alliances, it becomes necessary to add another level of analysis—is the treaty purely defensive, or does it contain provisions that require mutual assistance in the offense? The evidence that treaties and alliances provide, when placed in the proper

context, will show that the vast majority of U.S. foreign obligations between 1787 and 1941 were economic, rather than military, in nature. If, as stated at the end of Chapter 1, the grand strategies and foreign policies of the United States from 1787 to 1941 were truly ancestors of the Open Door, the record will support that theory. Classifying America's treaties and alliances will demonstrate that prior to possessing a significant military capability, the United States was already pursuing expansionist economic policies. Expansionist economic policies are one component of the grand strategy of the Open Door. A lack of entangling overseas military alliances in the same period confirms the reliance on economic expansion.

The use of U.S. military forces abroad plays an important role in U.S. grand strategy. Chapter 4 demonstrates the U.S. military has protected national interests on more occasions than it has fought the militaries of other nations.⁷⁷ As far as the development of U.S. policies goes, American interests are prioritized, as Douglas Johnson notes, “[b]ased on whether the defined interests were deemed to be vital, important or merely beneficial from a geopolitical point of view.”⁷⁸ Even the highest priority of interests, those deemed vital to the United States, do not necessarily equate to *casus belli* if threatened.⁷⁹ Therefore, those occasions where the United States has used military force carry significance in the grand strategic sense. When United States Marines landed on the Barbary Coast in 1805, the immediate significance of that action was to serve notice to local pirates that U.S. shipping was not to be molested. However,

⁷⁷ Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798 – 2004* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005).

⁷⁸ Douglas Johnson, ed. *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The U.S. Leadership Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1996), xv.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

the larger significance of that action, when viewed as a part of a pattern along with other U.S. military expeditions, indicates that the real significance of those actions was to serve notice to all listeners that the United States would use force to protect its access to free trade.⁸⁰

These three major variables, presidential doctrines and U.S. foreign policies, treaties and alliances, and military actions, share a close relationship to the elements of national power as explained in chapter 1. Clausewitz's maxim that "[w]ar is an extension of policy by other means" demonstrates a relationship between political maneuverings and more aggressive means that has a bearing on this paper.⁸¹ Grand strategies are not executed by any one means alone; rather grand strategies use all elements of a nation's power to bring about their ends. Chapter 4 provides the contextual description of major policies, treaties and military actions as they pertain to U.S. grand strategy, and classifies them according to their primary purpose: diplomatic, military or economic.

Using data from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), chapter 4 and Appendices A, B and C list the instances of use of U.S. military forces abroad in each major period. The actions in each period are classified as being primarily diplomatic, military or economic based on the narrative of the event provided in the original CRS report. In the instances where the description specifically stated a diplomatic task, such as guarding or escorting an ambassador, raising or lowering the U.S. flag, restoring order or providing government, the action is considered diplomatic in nature. Where the event description listed the action as protecting U.S. interests, preserving property, avenging

⁸⁰ William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 73.

⁸¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 21.

insults to U.S. shipping, or similar security-oriented duties, the event is economic in nature. In instances where the mission is the occupation or seizure of terrain or engaging in combat with the military of another nation-state, or the participation in a declared war, the event is considered military in nature. The classification in the appendices is noted in the far right column with a D, M, or E to denote diplomatic, military or economic.

Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis by comparing the Bretton Woods conference to the pattern of actions analyzed in chapter 4. The purpose of the Bretton Woods conference was to plan the postwar financial order, establish institutions for rebuilding the war-torn nations of Europe and create a fund for international development of other nations. The significance of Bretton Woods, compared against the great battles and campaigns of World War II, has largely faded from public knowledge, yet in analyzing what occurred at Bretton Woods, the true proof of this paper's hypothesis is clear.

The United States, in the closing months of World War II was a military and economic superpower, one of two in the world. Had the United States pursued a grand strategy of coercion or conquest, the motive (competition with a rival superpower and the desire to prevent another world war), means (the atomic bomb, air and naval supremacy and a robust land force) and opportunity (the occupation of Japan and Western Europe) all existed at the same time in 1945. Yet, for a short time in July of 1945, in the closing months of the largest, furthest reaching war the United States had ever fought, the national effort was focused on an economic conference in New Hampshire. As the research in chapter 5 proves, when all the parts were in place for the United States to take up the mantle of a military empire, U.S. grand strategy remained focused on the Open Door.

Chapter 6 consists of the fourth step in the comparison methodology. In this chapter, conclusions are presented. Finally, chapter 7 of this paper uses the conclusions to make recommendations.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The hypothesis of this paper is that the current grand strategy of the United States is the Open Door. The Open Door is the belief that the surest way to guarantee the safety and prosperity of Americans is for the United States to dominate the international system. This chapter will contextually describe the three major American foreign policy doctrines that influenced U.S. grand strategy in the period 1787 to 1941. Those three major doctrines are the Neutrality Proclamation (1793-1823), the Monroe Doctrine (1823-1917), and Wilsonian Democracy (1917-1941). Consistent with the methodology described in chapter 3, presidential doctrines & U.S. foreign policies are classified with U.S. treaties and alliances and instances of the use of U.S. military force abroad, in order to discern a larger pattern of events. This analysis begins with President Washington and the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793.

The Neutrality Proclamation formed the basis of American foreign policy from 1793 until President Monroe announced his Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Notable exceptions to U.S. neutrality include the Undeclared Naval War with France, 1798-1800 and the War of 1812. As America's first President, George Washington understood that the United States was, at best, a limited-military power. Put against any one of the European empires, the strength of the tiny U.S. Navy and Army, even when augmented by a militia, could not contest a serious effort at invasion by a European Power.⁸²

⁸² In 1793 the U.S. navy totaled 20 ships. The British navy, in contrast, numbered over 600 ships manned by over 90,000 sailors. Source: Mitch Williamson, *British Naval Supremacy: Some Factors Newly Considered*, 1992. <http://home.europa.com/~bessel/Naval/MW2.html> (accessed 10 November 2008).

Washington also realized that America was surrounded by potential invaders. The French owned the middle portion of the North American continent until the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. The Spanish owned Florida, part of modern-day Louisiana and the huge chunk of territory that comprises today's American Southwest. British colonial holdings were in the northwest, Canada and the Caribbean. The close proximity of all of these empires would make the United States an attractive agent for European nations in their balance-of-power contests. In his essay "The United States and the European Balance," Gordon A. Craig wrote, "As long as Great Britain, France and Spain retained possessions in North America, it was impossible for the republic's leaders to ignore with impunity the shifting relations among those states."⁸³ The quickest way for the United States to become the target of a European power, Washington knew, would be to invite attack by participating in the intrigues of the European monarchies. A policy of neutrality, however, would allow the United States a measure of security that no other means available could provide. In his farewell address, Washington reaffirmed his belief in neutrality when he stated,

If we remain one People, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest guided by our justice shall Counsel...Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.⁸⁴

⁸³ Gordon A. Craig. "The United States and the European Balance" in *Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy*, William P. Bundy, ed. (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1977), 68.

⁸⁴ President Washington, "Washington's Farewell Address 1796"
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/14319.htm> (accessed 24 November 2008).

President Washington issued the Neutrality Proclamation in 1793. At that time the United States held diplomatic treaties with France and Britain. Those treaties were the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France, signed during the Revolutionary War, and the Treaty of Paris, which had ended the war between the United States and Britain in 1783.

These two treaties influenced Washington's timing on the Neutrality Proclamation, if not his intentions. In January of 1793, the French had again declared war on Britain.⁸⁵ Though the Treaty of Alliance with France carried purely defensive obligations, those obligations were open to interpretation and Washington did not intend to enter the war on the French side.⁸⁶ The 1783 Treaty of Paris, with Britain, had also obligated the British to remove their garrisons along the American Northwest Territory. In 1793, the British had not yet completed their withdrawal.⁸⁷ Washington's desire to keep the United States out of a European War was key in his decision to announce U.S. neutrality, which de facto annulled the Treaty of Alliance with France (Congress formally annulled the treaty in 1798).⁸⁸

In contrast, the Treaty of Amenity, a trade treaty with the French signed at the same time as the Treaty of Alliance, was not repudiated when Washington proclaimed American neutrality.⁸⁹ Charles Stevenson, writer for the Kennedy Foundation, noted that

⁸⁵David Cody, "French Revolution" in *The Victorian Web*, <http://www.victorianweb.org/history/hist7.html> (accessed 11 November 2008).

⁸⁶Department of State, "Treaty of Alliance with France 1778," Article 2. *The Library of Congress Virtual Programs and Services*. Primary Documents in American History. <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/alliance.html> (accessed 10 November 2008).

⁸⁷Charles A. Stevenson, "The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793" in *National Security Policy Formulation Book of Case Study Readings* (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, March 2008), 11.

⁸⁸Department of State, "Treaty of Alliance with France 1778" Article 2. *The Library of Congress Virtual Programs and Services*. Primary Documents in American History, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/alliance.html> (accessed 10 November 2008).

⁸⁹Stevenson, 11, and Gordon, 71.

the Treaty of Amenity opened other trade doors for the United States, including trade arrangements with Spain, the Netherlands and Prussia.⁹⁰ The Jay Treaty followed U.S. Neutrality in 1794, in an attempt to lower British trade barriers and tariffs on American shipping and to expand American markets into the British West Indies. The attempt was less than successful: though the British withdrew from the Northwest Territory, Supreme Court Justice John Jay's attempt at opening the British West Indies to American shipping failed.⁹¹

After Washington's administration, the United States adopted a much more aggressive economic policy. President Jefferson's administration is perhaps best remembered for doubling the size of the United States with the 1803 Louisiana Purchase. The Embargo Act of 1807, which essentially forbade trade with foreign nations, was followed by the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, which modified the earlier Embargo Act to forbid trading only with England and France. Both of these attempts at economic coercion hurt the United States more than their intended European targets.⁹²

Militarily, the policy of neutrality that began with Washington's proclamation in 1793 and officially continued until the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (minus the War with Britain, 1812-1814), was in keeping with the United States' small military. Having recently endured the British occupation and finished the Revolutionary War, most Americans were in favor of a militia, but not a standing army. Prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, North Carolina and Pennsylvania's state

⁹⁰ Stevenson, 13.

⁹¹ Walter LaFeber, "Foreign Policies of a New Nation," in *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations* William Appleman Williams, ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), 31.

⁹² Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Jefferson the Napoleonic Wars and the Balance of Power," in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol 14., No. 2 (April 1959), 196-217.

Constitutions both read, “standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty; THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up.”⁹³ However, many of the founding fathers, as practical realists, understood the necessity of a regular military.

Alexander Hamilton believed that a standing army was a deterrent to war and essential for the survival of the young nation. Writing in the Federalist Papers, Hamilton theorized:

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are the colonies and establishments subject to dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers, create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest.⁹⁴

The argument against a standing army was, in Hamilton’s mind, a weakness that would lead to more trouble than it would prevent. The federal government must be responsible for the safety and security of her citizens. This, Hamilton believed, would be impossible without a regular defense establishment: “[w]e must receive the blow before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, *and meet the gathering storm*, [italics added for emphasis] must be abstained from, as contrary to the general maxims of a free government.”⁹⁵ Hamilton’s argument was successful, but only in a very limited way.

⁹³ Hamilton, Federalist #24.

⁹⁴ Hamilton, Federalist #24.

⁹⁵ Hamilton, Federalist #25.

Though Congress did authorize a standing army and navy, the overall military operations of the United States were limited. Besides notable exceptions during the Undeclared Naval War with France, 1798-1800, and the War of 1812, the majority of U.S. military operations had as their core purpose some variant of exploration, or protecting U.S. economic interests.

During the period of Neutrality, 1793-1820, there were 17 separate uses of armed force abroad by the United States (see Appendix A). None of these actions were classified as diplomatic in nature. Eight times during the period 1793-1820, the use of armed force abroad was of a distinctly military nature, including two wars with foreign powers (the Undeclared Naval War with France and the War of 1812). Of the two wars fought during the period of Neutrality, both were caused by economic conflicts. The remaining 9 instances of use of United States armed forces abroad during this period were distinctly economic in nature, protecting U.S. shipping or other interests.

Therefore, of the 17 times U.S. armed forces were employed abroad during the period of Neutrality, the majority were to protect U.S. economic interests, with a raw total of 9 economic missions compared to 8 military missions, for a slim margin in favor of economic interests. If one concedes that the Undeclared Naval War with France and the War of 1812 were both economic conflicts, then the adjusted total is 11 economic missions to 6 military missions, for a ratio of almost two to one. Overwhelmingly, U.S. military actions during this time were directed against pirates, in order to protect U.S.

merchant shipping (see Appendix A). In the West Indies alone, over three thousand pirate attacks on merchantmen were reported.⁹⁶

Taken together, the policy of neutrality, combined with the growing emphasis on U.S. trade treaties and military actions in the years 1793-1823 illustrated a definite trend of economic and physical expansion. While the United States avoided military obligations with other powers, the use of the U.S. military was employed often in support of the national interest.

The second major evolution of American foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine replaced the Neutrality Proclamation as the U.S. guiding foreign policy in 1823. Diplomat and future President John Quincy Adams spoke of this after returning from a trip to Europe in 1801. Adams' biographer Samuel Bemis noted, "The standard of living had steadily improved for the average man. The general well-being was testimony to the success of the foreign policy of George Washington and John Adams, which Thomas Jefferson took over and continued."⁹⁷ John Quincy Adams' observations are especially important, because he became the co-author of the Monroe Doctrine.

Adams was a federalist and an expansionist. Years before New York *Morning News* columnist John O'Sullivan coined the phrase Manifest Destiny, in December of 1845, Adams was viewing American expansion as essential to the nation's security. According to Frederick Merk, author of *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American*

⁹⁶ Richard F. Grimmit, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798 – 2004* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004). <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30172.htm> (accessed 9 November 2008).

⁹⁷ Samuel F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York: 1949), 111.

History, “John Quincy Adams wanted everything east, west, north and south of the [Rocky] mountains. In methods of diplomacy, as in aims, he was an imperialist.”⁹⁸

Following the acquisition of Florida in 1819, Adams wrote in his diary that the addition made it, “[s]till more unavoidable that the whole of the continent should ultimately be ours.”⁹⁹ Adams’ strong belief in America’s expansion across the “whole continent of North America” was evident in his professional life as well.

Adams served as President Monroe’s Secretary of State beginning in 1818. During this time, Adams was either wholly or partially responsible for several important treaties that expanded American territory west and south. One of Adam’s first accomplishments was an agreement with Britain for the joint occupation of the Oregon Country that held the region open to American pioneers.¹⁰⁰ In the same year, President Monroe authorized General Andrew Jackson to conduct a raid into Florida as reprisal for several raids conducted by Seminole warriors. Jackson executed his mission, but in the process captured St. Marks and Pensacola, cities owned by the Spanish empire. Eugene Wait noted in *America and the Monroe Years*, “Jackson exacerbated the international incident” by executing two British nationals, whom he suspected of proving arms and equipment to the Seminoles.¹⁰¹ This put the United States in a dangerous position. The reasoning behind Washington’s policy of neutrality was specifically to avoid putting U.S. military weaknesses against the might of a European power. In June of 1818, Spanish Foreign Minister Luis Onis wrote President Monroe, asking that General Jackson be

⁹⁸ Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 13.

⁹⁹ Norman Graebner, ed. *Manifest Destiny* (New York: The Bobbs- Merrill Company, 1968), xxiv.

¹⁰⁰ Merk, 15.

¹⁰¹ Eugene M. Wait, *America and the Monroe Years* (Huntington: Kroshka Books, 1999), 74.

punished.¹⁰² France, as well as the British, protested the American seizures of St. Marks and Pensacola at the same time that Onís sent his letter to President Monroe.¹⁰³

By capturing Spanish cities and executing British citizens, Jackson had invited reprisals that the tiny U.S. military was in no position to defend. Wait noted, “General Jackson’s seizures of St. Marks and Pensacola caused a furor in the Monroe cabinet. Jackson had not been authorized to do this.”¹⁰⁴ Prevailing political opinion was that President Monroe should punish General Jackson for exceeding the limits of his mission in order to placate foreign opinion.

John Quincy Adams took the opposite view. Adams recommended President Monroe retroactively authorize General Jackson’s actions. The logic behind Adams’ argument was that everything Jackson did was *defensive* and that as such, it was neither war against Spain nor violation of the Constitution.”¹⁰⁵ President Monroe agreed, and the settlement that resulted from the dispute would eventually be known as the Monroe Doctrine.

Far from instigating a war with Spain and Britain, Adams was able to use Jackson’s raid as a *fait accompli* to send an ultimatum to the European powers: either they would garrison their territories sufficiently to enforce the law, or they would cede control of them to the United States. The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1821 granted Florida and sections of present-day Louisiana to the United States, as well as the Spanish Oregon

¹⁰² Harry Ammon, *James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) 418-420.

¹⁰³ Merk, 19.

¹⁰⁴ Wait, 73.

¹⁰⁵ Remini, 55.

Country north of the 42nd parallel. The treaty extended U.S. territory from the Mississippi to the Pacific, but ceded Texas and California to Spain.¹⁰⁶

President Monroe formalized his doctrine, and the shift in American foreign policy from neutrality to one of expansion, in his 1823 address to Congress:

[T]he American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.¹⁰⁷

With the economy and territory of the United States expanding, the Monroe Doctrine signaled an important evolution in American foreign policy. Washington's policy of neutrality was appropriate for its time, when the national means were barely able to ensure the country's survival. The policy of expansion expressed in the Monroe Doctrine was an evolution that reflected growing American capabilities. However, the shift from neutrality to expansionism also brought with it a type of foreign entanglement in the form of the British Navy. The British considered it in their best interest that neither the Spanish nor the French recover any territory in North America; the British supported President Monroe's policy of non-intervention. This came in the form of a confidential letter from the British Foreign Minister Canning, which stated the British would rather see former colonies in North America incorporated into the United States than returned to

¹⁰⁶ The Library of Congress. *John Adams: A Resource Guide*
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/presidents/adams/> (accessed 10 November 2008).

¹⁰⁷ Monroe, 1823.

their European rivals.¹⁰⁸ For that reason, the British Navy underwrote the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁰⁹

U.S. military actions abroad in the period 1823-1917 indicated a continued emphasis on protection of trade and shipping rather than conquest (see Appendix B). Excluding major wars, the U.S. military was employed abroad 116 separate times.

The overwhelming majority of these missions were to protect U.S. interests, retaliate for depredations on American shipping, or to preserve U.S. lives and property. During the period of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1917, U.S. armed forces were employed abroad in 116 separate instances, not counting the American Civil War. Of those 116 instances of use of force abroad, 23 were diplomatic in nature, 9 were purely military in nature, including foreign 2 wars (the Mexican-American and Spanish-American). During the same period, U.S. armed forces were employed to protect economic interests 75 times. Additionally, Appendix B lists 8 instances of the use of U.S. armed forces abroad where the description is too vague to classify.

The data from the Monroe Doctrine years is the longest data set, spanning almost 100 years. During that time, the use of the U.S. armed forces abroad was overwhelmingly to protect economic interests, by a margin of 3:1 over diplomatic missions and over 8:1 compared to military missions.

Three notable exceptions to that pattern occurred during the years 1823-1917: the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848, the American Civil War of 1861-1865 and the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Mexican-American War, though indisputably a military action, occurred after the general failure of U.S. diplomacy to establish borders

¹⁰⁸ Ammon, 421-430.

¹⁰⁹ Wait 217 and Aamon 428.

between Mexico and Texas, annexed in 1845.¹¹⁰ The American Civil War can be classified as an internal struggle. However, the words and actions President Lincoln used to preserve the Union are consistent with the general trend of expansion demonstrated by U.S. foreign policy. President Lincoln's will to preserve the Union was stated in his First Inaugural Address, as "the most solemn [oath] to preserve, protect and defend [the Union]." ¹¹¹ Lincoln reiterated that promise in the Gettysburg Address when he said, "that this government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."¹¹² The fact that Lincoln was willing to endure four years of brutal civil war rather than release territory from the Union is to an extent indicative of the expansionist nature of the United States. Bruce D. Porter, author of *War and the Rise of the State*, expanded this analysis when he wrote, "the unique contribution of the Civil War [to American foreign policy] was not national consciousness but the irrevocable commitment of that consciousness to the constitutional structure established in 1787."¹¹³ The Civil War did more than preserve the Union, it consolidated it into a organized, industrialized modern nation-state.¹¹⁴

The Spanish-American War of 1898 occurred following the failure of Spain to grant Cuban independence.¹¹⁵ At the end of that conflict, the United States had evicted the Spanish from Cuba and annexed the Philippines. As Crapol and Schonberger noted, U.S. possession of the Philippines quickly became linked to economic interests in China

¹¹⁰ Merk, 85-88.

¹¹¹ Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., 4 March 1861.

¹¹² Abraham Lincoln, the Gettysburg Address, Gettysburg, PA, 19 November 1863.

¹¹³ Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 264.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Edward P. Crapol and Howard Schonberger, "The Shift to Global Expansion", in *From Colony to Empire* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), 197.

and the rest of Asia. The annexation of the Philippines caused an anti-imperialist outcry in the United States. As Secretary of State John Foster noted at the time, the occupation of those islands was necessary. “Whatever difference of opinion exists among American citizens,” Foster summarized, “all seems to be agreed upon the desirability of commercial expansion. In fact, it has become a necessity to find new and enlarged markets for our agricultural and manufactured products.”¹¹⁶ The Spanish American War, though more overtly military than the normal mode of U.S. expansion, was at its root an economic action as well, closely linked with the trade issues in China that a year later would cause John Hay to pen his *Open Door notes*.¹¹⁷

Commercial expansion would drive U.S. grand strategy throughout the twentieth century as well. The U.S. “Open Door” policy was born in this period of world-wide economic expansion. Between 1899 and 1900, Secretary of State John Hay penned his “Open Door notes” while on a diplomatic mission to China. Hay’s notes recommended that no nation “interfere with any treaty or port” of another nation in China, that Chinese tariffs be applied equally to all nations, that no nation be taxed higher than any other for moving goods into China.¹¹⁸ This policy, essentially serving notice to the European powers that the United States was committed to maintain open access to Chinese markets, was a unique blend of isolationism and the Monroe Doctrine, with some of Lincoln’s determination to fight if provoked writ in. As the U.S. annexation of

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 198.

¹¹⁷ John Hay replaced Foster as Secretary of State in 1899 and quickly moved to block European spheres of influence in Asia. His Open Door notes were a direct outgrowth of that.

¹¹⁸ John Hay, *Open Door Notes* 1898, 1900 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/14319.htm> (accessed 24 November 2008).

the Philippines demonstrated, when Hay wrote the Open Door into official policy, it had been the de facto guidance for some time.

Further proof of the evolutionary nature of American foreign policy, is apparent in the 1900 statement of future Secretary of State Richard Olney:

The international policy suitable to our infancy and our weakness was unworthy of our maturity and our strength; that the traditional rules regarding our relations to Europe, almost a necessity of the conditions prevailing an century ago, were inapplicable to the changed conditions of the present day; and that both duty and interest required us to take our true position in the European family and to both reap all the advantages and assume all the burdens incident to that position.¹¹⁹

In context with the Monroe Doctrine, the annexation of the Philippines, John Foster's acknowledgement of the continued need for economic expansion and Hay's Open Door notes, Olney's statement is another indication that U.S. interests were outgrowing the regional focus of the Monroe Doctrine.

Robert W. Tucker, Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy and Johns Hopkins University, and David C. Hendrickson, Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado College, in their work *The Imperial Temptation*, noted that during the first years of the twentieth century "there was no denying a change had taken place... the doctrine of isolation and non-entanglement came to be seen by many Americans as too confining."¹²⁰ The Monroe Doctrine, as these events indicated, became obsolete in light of the United States' growing overseas interests. Just as the foreign policy of neutrality was outmoded by expanding interests, so in the early years of the twentieth century was

¹¹⁹ Richard Olney, 1900.

¹²⁰ Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York, NY, Council on Foreign Relations Press. 1992.), 178.

the United States was ready to evolve to a foreign policy more suited to a nation with interests that ranged the entire world.¹²¹

With these two conflicting imperatives, the American entry into World War I was only after the greatest of provocation. President Wilson, the father of what would become the Wilsonian Ideal, was elected on a platform of neutrality. Wilson continued to pursue the policy of neutrality when he stated to Congress in August of 1914 that the United States was neutral “in fact, as well as in name.”¹²² Even after the sinking of the *Lusitania* by a German U-Boat in 1915, Wilson maintained American neutrality. President Wilson was reelected in 1916 based in large part on the platform that “he kept us out of war.” It required a physical threat to the grand strategic ends of the United States, in the form of the Zimmerman Telegram and the prospect of a German-Mexican alliance, for Wilson to carry the United States into war. When President Wilson went before Congress to ask for a Declaration of War, he acknowledged that isolationism was no longer practical when he said, “Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved.... We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.”¹²³ Far more than acknowledging the futility of remaining neutral in world affairs, Wilson set the United States out on a policy that would come to determine her course until the U.S. entry into World War II. Wilson said, “The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Wilson, 1914.

¹²³ Wilson, 1917.

liberty.”¹²⁴ With these words, he took the concept of security and the grand strategic ends of the United States to a new level.

America no longer need fear the European Powers, nor confine its concept of security to a buffer in the Western Hemisphere. By pledging to make the world safe for democratic governments, President Wilson was exhorting a new set of ways and means that would guarantee America’s grand strategic end by fundamentally changing the world order to one more favorable to American freedom. Near the war’s end, Wilson would argued in his *Fourteen Points* speech for “[a] general association of nations... formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”¹²⁵ President Wilson’s goal was the League of Nations.

Wilson’s stated goal of making the world safe for democracy, in 1918, would have made the United States a world leader twenty-five years earlier. Indeed, Wilson’s views were widely regarded outside the United States. H.G. Wells wrote, “Humanity leapt to accept and glorify Wilson... It seized on him as its symbol. He was transfigured in the eyes of men. He ceased to become a common statesman; he became a Messiah.”¹²⁶ The U.S. Congress disagreed with Wilson, however, and the United States did not enter the League of Nations.

The American refusal to enter the League of Nations did not signify a withdrawal back into isolationism. Throughout the Interwar Period, the United States was globally engaged. Beginning in 1921, the United States sought to involve Great Britain, France,

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Wilson, 1918.

¹²⁶ H.G. Wells, *The Shape of Things to Come* (Penguin, 1933.)
<http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/w/wells/hg/w45th/index.html>, Ch. VII

Italy and Japan in naval disarmament talks, intervened diplomatically in Central American conflicts and sought worldwide endorsement of an agreement to regulate aerial warfare. Throughout the Harding and Coolidge administrations, the United States expanded its trade agreements, and worked toward international peace agreements, such as the Kellogg-Brand pact.¹²⁷

Wilsonian Democracy, viewed in context with the global diplomatic and economic engagement of the United States from 1917 to 1941, continued the pattern of expansion of relative power begun in the neutrality period and continued during the Monroe Doctrine. The policy of making the world safe for democracy was a major change from the policies that preceded it. The treaties and alliances that the United States engaged in during the Wilsonian period were economic, or related to disarmament. The use of American political power to encourage disarmament in the wake of the First World War was also a major shift from the previous policy.

During the Wilsonian period, 1917-1941, U.S. armed forces were used abroad on 29 separate occasions. The table shows 5 diplomatic missions during the period. There were 9 actions of a purely military nature, including U.S. participation in World War I and the escort patrols of U.S. shipping in the Atlantic in the months immediately prior to U.S. entry into World War II.¹²⁸ During the same time frame, 13 missions were classified as economic in nature, with an additional two missions classified as unknown.

¹²⁷ Lester H. Brune, Richard Dean Burns, *Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 434.

¹²⁸ One could argue that escorting U.S. shipping bound for England in 1941 was an economic action. On the surface, those actions meet every criteria for a economic mission; however consideration is given to the fact that lend-lease materials and other wartime goods bound for Britain in 1941 were de facto military in nature, the conscious decision of the U.S. government to aid a belligerent party in war.

This pattern reinforces the data from earlier periods. The U.S. of armed force abroad by the United States during the period 1917-1941 was primarily economic, although the results are not as skewed as those from the period of the Monroe Doctrine, in which economic missions overshadowed military ones by a margin of 3:1. The use of U.S. military force abroad remained largely consistent with the pattern of military force in support of economic aims. The major exception was the U.S. entry into World War I.

The United States emerged from World War I as the only belligerent that had gained status. In 1919, the United States was already the world's leading economic power and had the potential to be the world's leading military power.¹²⁹ Contrary to popular opinion, the United States did not pass the interwar years holding onto the obsolete isolationist policies of the previous century. Though the United States did not join the League of Nations, it exercised what Frank Costigliola described as an "awkward dominion" in Europe.¹³⁰ At the end of the First World War, American intentions for the postwar order in Europe were the same as they were in 1945: an independent, European economy. Layne noted that, far from being isolationist at conclusion of World War I, "Washington was the prime mover behind the Dawes and Young plans, which addressed the troublesome issue of German reparations. During the 1920s Washington promoted Germany's economic reconstruction and its political reintegration into Europe."¹³¹ Throughout the '20s and '30s the United States attempted to act as an offshore balancer, counting on the European powers to refrain from dangerous alliances and arms races.

¹²⁹ Layne, 39.

¹³⁰ Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933* (New York: Cornell University Press 1985), 10.

¹³¹ Layne, 40.

The multipolar system, in itself a precursor for “balanced” peace, failed in the aftermath of World War I. As the Axis powers began their run-up to war in the 1930s, policymakers in the United States saw two dangers. In the east was the physical threat of Japanese militarism, combined with a rapidly expanding economy and demand for raw materials. In Europe, the self-regulated economy of the Fascist states, if unchecked, would close markets to outside (American) investment. The failure of U.S. policy in the post World War I decades fresh in their minds, U.S. policymakers resolved to ensure America’s security in the postwar international system through an ambitious, expansive concept of the United States’ role as a postwar world leader. To do this, they “concluded that U.S. postwar ‘global’ hegemony was the prerequisite for attaining these objectives.”¹³²

President Wilson’s views would outlive him in two particulars: First, the concept of ensuring American security by fundamentally changing the world would reemerge as the United States planned for the post-World War II environment. Second was the far-reaching impact that Wilson’s ideas would have on American political thought. His ideas, Mandelbaum, noted, would “come to dominate the world.”¹³³ Among the significant number of American diplomats and public servants that would come to represent the “Wilsonian School” were future Secretary of State Cordell Hull and none other than Franklin D. Roosevelt.

¹³² Layne, 39.

¹³³ Mandelbaum, 18.

CHAPTER 5

TESTING

The foreign policies of Neutrality, the Monroe Doctrine and Wilsonian Democracy share common elements. Chapter 4 demonstrated these common elements by examining each of these three foreign policies in context with major treaties and military actions in the same periods. The pattern of U.S. expansionism from 1787 to 1941 is clear. The foreign policies and presidential doctrines, when viewed in context with treaties and alliances and the use of military force, support the hypothesis of the Open Door as U.S. grand strategy.

However, the true test of the hypothesis, that U.S. grand strategy is that of the Open Door, can be seen at the end of World War II when the United States emerged as a world superpower. In the closing months of World War II, the United States was clearly a world leader, both militarily and economically. The other Allied Powers emerged victorious from that war only in the sense of national survival, but the United States remained untouched by war and, even though the mobilization for World War II dwarfed any other U.S. war effort before it, the standard of living for the average American was far above that of their European counterparts.

The criteria for testing this hypothesis are simple. Had the United States pursued a grand strategy of coercion or conquest, the motive (competition with a rival superpower and the desire to prevent another world war), means (the atomic bomb, air and naval supremacy and a robust land force) and opportunity (the occupation of Japan and Western Europe) all existed at the same time in 1945. Yet, for a short time in July of 1945, in the closing months of the largest, furthest reaching war the United States had

ever fought, the national effort was focused on an economic conference in New Hampshire. As this chapter will demonstrate, when all the parts were in place for the United States to take up the mantle of a military empire, U.S. grand strategy remained focused on the Open Door.

This chapter analyses the Bretton Woods conference using the comparison methodology, using presidential statements and letters, the actual conduct of the Bretton Woods Conference, and military actions as a means of placing the Bretton Woods conference in context with the events surrounding it in order to demonstrate the special significance of this event.

The post-war economic order which was eventually known as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations, was the brainchild of a treasury department bureaucrat. In April of 1942 special advisor to the secretary of the treasury Harry White wrote a memorandum titled “Proposal for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations.”¹³⁴ The introduction to that memo read: “No matter how long the war lasts.... we shall be faced with three problems: to prevent disruption of foreign exchanges and the collapse of monetary and credit systems; to assure the restoration of foreign trade; and to supply the huge volume of capital that will be needed virtually throughout the world for reconstruction.”¹³⁵ White’s memo laid out the genesis for the postwar international security apparatus by establishing a fund for reconstruction following the war and a clearinghouse (the World Bank) to monitor and control that fund pursuant to the rules laid down by an international organization, the United Nations.

¹³⁴ Thomas Oatley, *International Political Economy* (New York: Pearson, 2006), 223.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were both significantly concerned with shaping the post-war financial order. According to economist Mark Harrison, author of *The Economics of World War II*, both Roosevelt and Hull “believed that a vast array of commercial restrictions and discriminatory trade practices” like the sphere of influence advocated by the British government were largely responsible for World War II. Roosevelt’s intention was to avoid a repetition of post World War I period.¹³⁶

That President Roosevelt was as concerned with the post-war economic order at this particular point in his administration subtly, but concretely, quantifies the importance he placed on it. Roosevelt was not a well man, he was tired. Having already born the office of President for two terms, 1944 was an election year. Jim Bishop, a Roosevelt biographer noted that at the time, the president was not only tired and dreading the coming campaign, he was dying.¹³⁷ The President’s heart was failing. Nine months after Bretton Woods, Franklin D. Roosevelt would be dead. In the summer of 1944, leading up to Bretton Woods, President Roosevelt was already being examined by a heart specialist daily.

The United States was at war on two fronts, with its forces spanning the globe. The long-awaited invasion of Europe was only three weeks old when Bretton Woods took place, between Omaha Beach and the Airborne landings, over 5000 Americans had perished in the operation in its weeks. In Normandy, 130,000 Allied troops were still in the Assault phase of the invasion at the end of June. In the Pacific the invasion of Saipan

¹³⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Praeger, 2005), 218.

¹³⁷ Jim Bishop, *FDR’s Last Year* (New York, NY. William Morrow & CO. 1974.), 87.

was underway, a vicious cave-to-cave fight that would claim nearly 3000 American lives and an additional 10,000 wounded before mid-July. As he prepared to attend Bretton Woods, Roosevelt had been briefed on the plans for the invasion of the Japanese main island. Casualty estimates, even in the short term, were staggering and the contest for Japan's home islands was already figured to cost the United States a million casualties.¹³⁸

On the other side of victory was demobilization. In the summer of 1944, the United States had 14 million men and women in uniform and a substantial portion of the civilian population employed in the defense and munitions industries. Lind noted that Cordell Hull shared the President's conviction that "unhampered trade dovetailed with peace." Keeping the Open Door open and preventing a massive postwar depression was a major priority of the administration.¹³⁹

A February 1944 State Department memo predicted that failure to create an Open Door international economy would lead to "revival, in more intense form, of the international economic warfare which characterized the twenties and thirties. The development of sound economic relations is closely related to security."¹⁴⁰ In an 11 July 1944 letter from Roosevelt to Democratic Party Chairman Robert E. Hannegan, Roosevelt wrote,

To win this war wholeheartedly, unequivocally and as quickly as we can is our task of the first importance. To win this war in such a way that there can be no future world wars in the foreseeable future is our second objective. To provide occupations, and to provide a decent standard of living... after the war for all Americans are the final objectives.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Ibid, 92.

¹³⁹ David Gisselquist, *The Political Economy of International Banking* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1981), 96.

¹⁴⁰ Lind, 44.

¹⁴¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington DC, to Robert E Hannegan, 11 July 1944.

The interplay of economic prosperity on Roosevelt's priorities, in the midst of World War II, is a telling example of the importance placed on economic issues.

The date for Bretton Woods was set for July 1944. At that meeting, the country representatives were to come together and resolve their final differences before ratifying—and thus financially committing—their respective nations. President Roosevelt personally attended the conference. As Roosevelt biographer James Burns noted, the President opened the conference by saying, “Commerce is the lifeblood of a free society. We must see to it that the arteries which carry that blood stream are not clogged again.”¹⁴² The president's continued emphasis on economics, during an election year, and in the middle of the largest war the United States had ever fought, was telling.

From the beginning, the British delegation raised objections. “At the heart of the conflict,” writes Schild, “was the question of whether, under the rules of the International Monetary Fund, a state would be able to depreciate its currency to give its own industry a competitive advantage in foreign markets.”¹⁴³ The British were against returning to the gold standard. They hoped for an American agreement that each state would be able to adjust its currency according to its own needs.¹⁴⁴

The U.S. delegation, conversely, was confident that only the United States and Switzerland would remain on the gold standard at the end of the war. Because of that, the Americans advocated the value of currencies be expressed in terms of gold, without

¹⁴² James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. 1970), 514.

¹⁴³ Michael Schild, *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944* (New York: MacMillan, 1956), 292.

¹⁴⁴ Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, *Economics Explained* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 33.

being tied to the metal.¹⁴⁵ The U.S. delegation eventually persuaded the British delegation to accept a system under which the value of any nation's currency entering the World Bank would be determined relative to the fixed standard of one ounce of gold equal to \$35 United States dollars.¹⁴⁶ Therein, in the fixing of the U.S. dollar as literally the gold standard of international currency, lay the future of American economic dominance.¹⁴⁷

The significance of this maneuver, against the visual and emotive effect of the battles underway in Europe and the East, went largely unnoticed. Media in the United States were largely critical of the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in general. The *Wall Street Journal* wrote on 21 July 1944 that when delegates spoke of the value of their plan as an aid to world commerce, “enthusiasm was lacking.” They had set up a multi-billion dollar machinery to deal with problems “which are far from clear and must be guessed.”¹⁴⁸ Washington had pushed for the Bretton Woods system, understanding that “stabilization of finance and monetary markets” in the form of the U.S. dollar, fixed against gold as the international standard, “increased demand for American exports, created jobs at home, and safeguarded foreign investment.”¹⁴⁹

The Bretton Woods system accomplished tangible results for the progress of the post-war world. The system of multinational trade and the fixing of the U.S. dollar as the

¹⁴⁵ Burns, 518.

¹⁴⁶ Heilbroner and Thurow, 185.

¹⁴⁷ Oatly, 223.

¹⁴⁸ Michael Schild, *Bretton Woods and Dumberton Oaks: American Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944* (New York: MacMillan, 1956), 303.

¹⁴⁹ W.W. Rostow. *The World Economy: History and Prospect* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), 296-297.

international currency standard, as well as the establishment of U.S. agency over the international monetary fund and the staffing of [what would become] the World Bank by U.S. agents precluded a post-war resurgence of British imperialism.¹⁵⁰

The U.S. check on British post-war sphere of influence designs accomplished two purposes. The first was reopening western European markets and checking the Soviet closed-economic system. The second was usurping the British postwar economic strategy, thus creating a bipolar power arrangement for the first time in the world and thereby preventing the cycle of economic competition that would lead to a future war on the Continent.¹⁵¹

The decision to use the World Bank and the IMF as a means of fixing American currency was tendered less towards rebuilding the world than it was towards ensuring that the kind of economic competition that had created the First and Second World Wars could never happen again. Simultaneously, the grand strategy of the Open Door dictated that for Europe to remain open to American trade in the emerging bi-polar world, it would have to be American dollars that rebuilt the key industrial areas of the continent.¹⁵²

The Bretton Woods accords remained in place until President Nixon took the United States off the gold standard in 1971. That the creation of the IMF and the World Bank directly contributed to post-war stability and American economic supremacy is obvious—but indirectly, the economic supremacy that Bretton Woods created during the twenty-six years of its existence enabled other measures to be put in place throughout that time. When the Bretton Woods accords became obsolete, NATO was strong and

¹⁵⁰ Anatol Murad, *What Keynes Means* (New York: Brookman Associates, 1962), 179.

¹⁵¹ W.W. Rostow *The World Economy: History and Prospect* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), 297.

¹⁵² Murad, 179.

possessed the ability to defend itself, and Western Europe was co-opted into the American sphere. The kind of multi-polar jockeying for supremacy, for hegemony, that Roosevelt and Hull had feared would take place between the victorious allies after World War II's end never happened because the economic instrument of national power, wielded as it was in the Bretton Woods accords, had so linked the economic fortunes of potential Western competitors to America's own.¹⁵³

This, then, is how the grand strategy of the Open Door elevated the United States from its thirteen original colonies to world leader in the span of a century and a half. As of 1945 the United States was more than a superpower, it was a global hegemon in the true sense of the word. Hegemony, in the proper use of the term, implies not only leadership, but leadership exercised through the willing participation of the led. The establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the fixing of the dollar as the world standard currency did more than simply make the United States an economic superpower. Rather, the willing participation of the 44 member nations present at the Bretton Woods Conference placed the United States in a position of leadership of the free world.

The bi-polar world created by the end of World War II placed the United States in direct competition with the Soviet Union; however the grand strategy of the Open Door remained the grand strategy of the United States from 1945 until the present. The Cold War, the U.S. policy of Containment, and the post-Cold War expansion of NATO and other alliances into the former Soviet sphere, all of these were the actions of a global hegemon intent on maintaining its status. From 1945 until today, the United States has

¹⁵³ Derek H. Aldcroft, *The European Economy 1914-1970* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 153.

continued to pursue a grand strategy that centered on the goals of the Open Door-ensuring U.S. security and prosperity by dominating the international system.

The manner in which the United States has maintained dominance, through the willing participation of other nations and continued economic expansion, all of these things further confirm the hypothesis that U.S. grand strategy is the Open Door. When President Clinton and President George W. Bush both spoke of ensuring the prosperity and security of the American people, the commonality of purpose was real. Each was exhibiting the latest two links in a common grand strategy that goes back to 1787.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The beginning of this paper illustrated that President Clinton and President George W. Bush shared, in public remarks, the same emphasis on preserving the security and prosperity of Americans. Although each had a different manner of providing that security and prosperity, the similarity in ends was striking. Was that common emphasis on security and prosperity really a glimpse at the grand strategy of the United States?

To answer that question required preliminary work. Before attempting to explain the grand strategy of the United States, a general definition of grand strategy was required. To arrive at that general definition of grand strategy, the researcher examined the theoretical linkages of policy to strategy made by Clausewitz and Jomni. From the works of those two theorists, it was clear that grand strategy was intricately linked to a nation's policy. The specific nature of that linkage required additional information. The supporting documentation was provided in the writings of several twentieth century theorists and academics.

An analysis of the writings of B.H. Liddell-Hart, Paul Kennedy and Thomas P.M. Barnett confirmed the relationship of policy to grand strategy, and elaborated on that linkage. These authors defined grand strategy as incorporating not just policy, but the whole of a nation's power—its economic, political and military capabilities—to realize a vision beyond winning a single war. Comparing these writings to the theoretical definition of grand strategy poised by the U.S. Army's War College aided in the concept of national values that Liddell-Hart, Kennedy and Barnett did not specify in their respective definitions. The result of this comparison yielded a general definition of grand

strategy that this paper described as the combination of national purpose and interests that uses all elements of a nation's power to bring about more advantageous future conditions for that nation.

The researcher then formulated a hypothesis built on that general definition. The hypothesis was that the grand strategy of the United States was that of the Open Door. The Open Door was defined as "the use of all the elements of U.S. national power to defend the core political and economic interests of the United States and ensure security and prosperity of its citizens through domination of the international system."

The Open Door, as described in this paper, meets the definition of a grand strategy. Grand strategy is a combination of national purpose and interests. The Open Door embodies that sense of national purpose and interests. The economic open door and the political open door are the vital national interests that comprise U.S. domestic core values.

Grand strategy uses all elements of a nation's power. The means of the Open Door emphasizes the relative power of the United States. That relative power is the sum of the United States' political legitimacy, military superiority and economic dominance and the effect that power can have on the international system.

Finally, grand strategy prescribes bringing about a better future for the nation concerned. The ways and the end of the Open Door describe the future that U.S. grand strategy has sought to create. The basic ends of security and prosperity are eloquently described in the preamble to the Constitution, the "common defense and general welfare" of ourselves and future generations, our posterity. The Open Door requirement of U.S.

hegemony, the ability to influence the international system, is what guarantees the United States' ability to realize that end.

Therefore, the hypothesis of the Open Door satisfied the definition of grand strategy. What remained was to determine if the hypothesis could translate to the real world. To determine the real-world applicability of the Open Door, the research focused on political, economic and military endeavors of the United States. The research spanned from the ratification of the Constitution in 1787 to 1941, the eve of U.S. entry into World War II.

The research examined three specific data sets. Those data sets were major U.S. foreign policies, treaties and alliances, and the use of U.S. military forces abroad. Classification of these data sets together was based on the period in which they happened. The periods established were the dates that each major foreign policy was in effect. President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation was announced in 1793 and remained in effect until 1823 when the Monroe Doctrine superseded it. The treaties and alliances agreed upon, and use of U.S. military forces abroad that occurred during that same period were classified together as representative of the policy of Neutrality.

The Monroe Doctrine was the major U.S. foreign policy from 1823 until the United States entered World War I in 1917. The treaties and alliances agreed upon and the use of U.S. military forces abroad that occurred during that same period were classified together as representative of the policy of the Monroe Doctrine. The period of Wilsonianism began when President Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany in 1917 and continued until the United States entered World War II in late 1941. The treaties and alliances agreed upon and the use of U.S. military forces abroad that occurred

during that same period were classified together as representative of the policy of Wilsonianism.

The premise behind classifying the data into these periods was that, by placing treaties and military actions in context with foreign policy, the three data sets would form a pattern. Expansion is a key component of the Open Door; the United States did not start out as a global power, it had to work toward that status. A constant trend of expanding relative power would be interpreted as confirming the Open Door hypothesis. Specifically, that pattern of expansion would have to be representative of the ways defined in the Open Door hypothesis. A pattern of economic and political expansion first, with military capabilities growing because of the first two was considered desirable.

During the period of Neutrality, 1793 to 1823, the United States remained free of foreign military alliances, but was heavily involved in international trade. U.S. trade treaties engaged virtually every European nation, especially the Western European nations and their colonies in South America and the West Indies. Economic issues, particularly penetrating British-dominated markets, were vital interests, as was the general protection of American merchant shipping. The political borders of the United States more than doubled in size during the same period, but that increase was by means of purchase, not conquest. Instead, U.S. military actions abroad were largely for the purposes of protecting U.S. shipping and other interests. The two notable exceptions, the undeclared naval war with France in 1798-1800 and the War of 1812, were primarily economic in nature, in each case caused by the overly aggressive economic policies of both belligerents.

The Monroe Doctrine, the United States' most enduring foreign policy, lasting from 1823-1917, when the United States entered World War I, succeeded neutrality. Placing the major treaties and uses of military force abroad in context with the Monroe Doctrine yielded a pattern similar to that of the Neutrality period. During the period of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States reached its present size through a combination of purchase and conquest. The overwhelming pattern of U.S. force used abroad was, like the Neutrality period before, in support of economic policies. The three notable exceptions were the Mexican-American War of 1846-48, the American Civil War 1861-65 and the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Of these three large-scale conflicts, the first was fought over a border dispute with Mexico and the second to preserve the Union. In both of these cases, the root causes of these military actions were, as Clausewitz would say, an "extension of policy by other means." The underlying motivations in each were the preservation, not conquest of U.S. territory. Only the Spanish-American War was caused by something other than defense of vital interests; specifically for the purposes of retribution over the loss of the *Maine* and insults to the U.S. President. However, the Spanish American War is at least consistent with the Monroe Doctrine in that it expelled a European power from the Western Hemisphere.

After the Civil War, U.S. relative power expanded beyond the Western Hemisphere. American trade expanded into Asia, followed by the imposition of political will on economic rivals there, then finally a military presence to protect those far-flung interests. The pattern of U.S. expansion during the period of the Monroe Doctrine further strengthened the hypothesis of the Open Door.

The data also indicated that the Monroe Doctrine was de facto obsolete before the United States embarked upon President Wilson's self-stated crusade to "make the world safe for democracy." By the time the United States entered World War I, the economic and political power of the United States had already grown beyond the Western Hemisphere. That the military establishment began World War I unprepared was considered additional confirmatory data—more evidence, as stated earlier, of a political and economic expansion that pulled military capability after it.

The period of Wilsonianism, from 1917 to 1941, continued the trend of expansionist economics and growing relative power that started with the Neutrality period and continued during the Monroe Doctrine. Though the United States did not enter the League of Nations, President Wilson's influence was exhibited in many other ways. The U.S. attempted a world leadership role in the period from 1917 to 1941. That role was primarily economic, and a good portion of U.S. political power during that same period was spent in efforts at multilateral disarmament. These actions continued the now-strong pattern of economic expansion and political legitimacy and only a secondary emphasis on military power. The use of U.S. forces abroad during the period from 1917 to 1941 is further consistent with the American peacetime employment of military power, primarily devoted to securing national interests.

Chapter 5 tested the Open Door hypothesis by examining a key event after 1941. The event, the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, was analyzed in categories similar to the categories used in chapter 4. Presidential emphasis, in the form of President Roosevelt's public and private thought; domestic and international political circumstances; and the progress of the war were classified together and analyzed in

context. The results showed a continued and overwhelming American emphasis on economic superiority. President Roosevelt considered commerce the lifeblood of democracy, and as such placed considerable importance on the outcome of Bretton Woods. This was indicated by his private letters and his public speeches at the time, especially his commitment to win the war, demobilize and do so while maintaining a high standard of living for the American people. President Roosevelt's presence at the conference also demonstrates the weight he put on the effort at Bretton Woods, given that in July of 1944, President Roosevelt was under the routine care of a heart specialist. Further, the summer of 1944 was campaign time for the November 1944 Presidential Election. Finally, the president's personal feelings were that, although the war was going in the Allies' favor, it was far from over. The liberation of Europe was only barely underway and in the Pacific, the most expensive battle, the invasion of the Japanese main island, was still on the horizon. Taken in context with the establishment of the U.S. dollar as the world currency and the birth of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, both of which were headquartered in the United States, the evidence confirms the hypothesis of this paper.

The primary goal of this paper was to confirm or deny the hypothesis, that the grand strategy of the United States is, and has been since 1787, the Open Door. The research has supported that conclusion. However, incidental to proving the hypothesis of this paper, the research process brought out other discoveries that are worthy of note.

The words of U.S. presidents carry with them significant power. A large portion of the research presented in this paper dealt with the statements and private communications of U.S. presidents, from George Washington to Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Throughout that 158-year period, presidential statements consistently translated into policies. President Washington convened the cabinet to solicit opinions, and listened to considerable debate before he issued the Neutrality Proclamation. Conversely, President Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, wrote the Monroe Doctrine retroactive to General Andrew Jackson's raid into Florida. President Wilson was reelected on a platform of neutrality in World War I, yet he implanted not only a just cause for war, but a sense of world mission into the American consciousness when he spoke of making the world safe for Democracy.

When U.S. presidents make a statement of policy, the effects that follow often outlive the stimulus that caused them. The stimulus that moved President Washington to adopt a policy of Neutrality was the fear that the French government would call for U.S. entry into their war with Britain under the auspices of the 1778 Treaty of Alliance. Following the Neutrality Proclamation, Congress formally annulled the Treaty of Alliance four years later. Yet the policy of Neutrality remained formally in place for three decades, until 1823. Even after the Neutrality Proclamation was superseded by the Monroe Doctrine, the concept of neutrality remained part of the American political consciousness until the U.S. entry into World War II in 1941.

President Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams crafted the Monroe Doctrine as a means of preventing political embarrassment when General Andrew Jackson exceeded the scope of his punitive mission into Florida. This retroactive policy established the United States as a regional power, and was the United States' longest-lasting foreign policy, enduring from 1823 to the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917. The Monroe Doctrine not only precluded further European colonization in the Americas,

but it actually moved foreign powers to dispose of their North American holdings. Far more than just covering a potential international incident in 1818, the Monroe Doctrine was a decisive force in shaping the size and breadth of the United States today.

The Wilsonian view of America's mission, of making the world safe for democracy, was the product of an inherently isolationist administration. Yet, when forced into war, President Wilson charted a course for the United States' that not only outlived its author, but eventually moved the U.S. to a position of world leadership. It is ironic that President Wilson's goals failed in the short term, and that U.S. leadership in the 1919 post-war international system was not consolidated by membership in the League of Nations; but that failure was only in the short term. Two decades later as the United States emerged victorious in World War II; President Wilson's objective was realized when the United States assumed the role of leader of the free world. Each of the three major foreign policies from 1787 to 1941 had consequences and effects that far outlived the circumstances that brought them about and the presidents that issued them.

Each of the three major foreign policies of the United States was obsolete for years before being superseded by another. Neutrality was the guiding foreign policy of the United States from 1794 to 1823, when President Monroe formally announced the Monroe Doctrine. But the Monroe Doctrine was issued after the fact, after General Jackson's raid into Florida in 1818. Prior to 1818, President Jefferson's aggressive economic policies in 1807 and 1809 had instigated two wars. By the time President Monroe formalized the shift in American foreign policy in his 1823 address to Congress, Neutrality had been obsolete for several years.

The Monroe Doctrine remained the major American Foreign Policy for nearly a century, but U.S. economic interests expanded beyond the Western Hemisphere at least twenty years before President Wilson adopted a world-wide focus. The acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1898, John Hay's Open Door notes, and the deployment of U.S. military capabilities to the Philippines and China to protect U.S. commercial interests at the end of the nineteenth century all indicated that the Monroe Doctrine was obsolete in practice, if not in policy, at least twenty years before the United States entry into World War I.

Ultimately, though, the most significant information to emerge from this research was the understanding of how policy, economics and military action have combined throughout America's history to produce what is, clearly, a grand strategy. The Open Door is an unwritten grand strategy, there is no document or series of volumes that codify what U.S. policy should be. Rather the grand strategy of the United States remains an idea, itself the product of many other ideas that together make up not just a security strategy, but a national statement of being, of purpose.

Against the argument that U.S. foreign policy has been a tragedy or a series of brutal conquests and coercion the evidence bears out the truth. If the desire for empire were there, if that motive actually existed as part of the values and national purpose that comprise U.S. grand strategy, then in 1945 the means and opportunity would have been too great to pass up. Yet the United States eschewed empire through coercion, instead opting for economic hegemony- world leadership, through the willing participation of other self-governed states.

The charge that the United States has no grand strategy is equally laughable. It is true that our Constitution gives great power to individual presidents. It is equally true that the foreign policy of the United States is often reactive, instead of proactive and that those policies tend to live on past their usefulness. Yet to look at individual administrations, even the course of national policy for a single decade, and charge that the United States has no grand strategy is to fail to see the forest for the trees.

The real elegance of the grand strategy of the United States is its transparency. There are no “cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried from generation to generation” as President Wilson noted, because such designs are impossible “when public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation’s affairs.”¹⁵⁴ Rather, the grand strategy of the United States is a matter of historical record, apparent to anyone that cares to look. The grand strategy of the Open Door is apparent in the word of U.S. presidents, the investment of the nation and the manner in which it employs, and chooses not to employ, its military.

¹⁵⁴ Wilson, 1917.

CHAPTER 7

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has established the grand strategy of the United States is the Open Door. What remains is to ascertain how the research presented here can be put to further academic and practical use.

Many of the conclusions reached in chapter 6 represent areas for additional research. The words of U.S. presidents have power. Major U.S. foreign policies tend to have enduring power, to the point where they have tended to become obsolete before they have been replaced. The grand strategy of the United States is readily apparent in the words of its leaders, the investment of its treasure and the use of its military. All of these are general trends that emerged from the research, but whether or not any of these general trends can be refined in theories or maxims that have a predictive value is beyond the scope of this paper. If it can be established that any of these general trends, based on analysis of data from 1787 to 1945, have a predictive quality, a wide variety of application, from academic study to future weapons systems and theater engagement strategies, is possible.

At the policy level, the trends here seem to indicate that a more proactive approach to foreign policy might be in order. If the majority of U.S. foreign policies are indeed reactive, as opposed to proactive in nature, then that also is an area for further study to determine if, and how, the policy-making process might be improved. Potentially, additional research in this area applies not only to the actual policy-makers in the U.S. Government, but to the policy recommenders as well; particularly field grade officers on senior and general staffs.

With a more immediate focus, this paper recommends that the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) alter the core Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curriculum to include a definition of grand strategy, show how grand strategy is linked to policy and national purpose and impart a conceptual understanding of the grand strategy of the United States. Before detailing this recommendation, it is helpful to review the current strategic studies program.

Resident ILE students are introduced to strategic theory and the national security process beginning with the C200 “Strategic Studies” block of classes, which occur between the second and third weeks of ILE common core instruction.¹⁵⁵ The progression of classes in the C200 block is cascading, mirroring the cascading nature of U.S. strategies. Students are introduced to strategic concepts in C202 before learning about the national security organization and processes in C203. Only after learning the process are students exposed to national strategies in C204, which then leads, or cascades, to DOD organization and processes in C205 before reviewing Department of Defense strategies in C206 and then regional strategies in C207.¹⁵⁶ Each individual class presents new material within the context of previously discussed subjects.

Based on the current C200 methodology, the logical point to introduce grand strategy and U.S. grand strategy is during the C202 “Strategic Concepts” class. The advance sheet for C202 defines the class and its ultimate objectives based on four areas. Those areas are scope, learning objectives, material, homework assignment and assessment plan. In order to better demonstrate how this recommendation complements,

¹⁵⁵ CGSOC AY Calendar for classes 08-01, 08-02 and 09-01.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Government *ILE Common Core C200 Strategic Studies Advance Sheets and Readings Book* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USA CGSC, 2007), C201AS-3.

rather than changes or detracts from, existing course materials, each of those four areas is discussed below.

The scope of C202, “the state and its place in the international system... and two main approaches to understanding how international relations work—realism and liberalism”¹⁵⁷ is the best place to define and discuss grand strategy in general. For students, C202 is the start point for all further strategic studies. The scope of discussion in C202 is also intended to include “the formulation and evaluation of strategy.”¹⁵⁸ Incorporating the definition of grand strategy forwarded in chapter 1 of this paper, and the exact definition of U.S. grand strategy defined in chapter 2 is appropriate to the scope of C202, which is also intended to serve as a theoretical base for more detailed discussion of the U.S. National Security Organization and processes in C203.

C202 supports the ILE Common Core Course Terminal Learning Objective (TLO) of “Explain how desired and undesired effects within the operational environment connect military strategic and operational objectives and tactical tasks.” Within that TLO, the C202 Enabling Learning Objective is “Discuss basic strategic concepts.” The standard for that ELO is that the seminar includes five specific topics, three of which are directly supported by the research presented in this paper. The three relevant discussion points for C202 are “[Discuss] linkages among a state’s purpose, interests, objectives and policies, programs and commitments in the formulation of a national security strategy,” followed by “[Discuss] theories of international relations,” and lastly “[Discuss] strategy and its component parts.” The research presented in chapters 1 and 2 of this paper

¹⁵⁷ U.S. Government *ILE Common Core C200 Strategic Studies Advance Sheets and Readings Book* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USA CGSC, 2007), C202AS-1.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

directly supports both of these ELOs by defining grand strategy and discussing the relationship of grand strategy to national values, which are interpreted through the lenses of realism and liberalism. In each learning objective for C202, the research in this paper reinforces and compliments the already established materials.

Because the major points presented in the first two chapters of this paper support the learning objectives of C202, inserting the additional ELO of “define grand strategy and understand its relationship to a states’ purpose, interests and objectives” could be done without driving any further changes to the class material, or requiring any additional training time.

Adding grand strategy to the beginning of the C200 block is an economic choice in terms of material required, too. The research presented in this paper is the property of the U.S. Government, and does not require any additional distribution rights to use either in part or whole. H. Richard Yarger’s 2006 monograph, *The Little Book of Big Strategy* is a U.S. Army War College product, and likewise does not require any further distribution rights to include in a CGSOC lesson plan. Because other of Yarger’s works are already part of the C200 block, and are part of the curriculum at the U.S. Army War College, which is the source material for much of the strategic theory presented in C200, Yarger’s monograph is particularly suited for inclusion in the C200 course materials.

The homework assignments for C200 currently require one review and five advance readings, for a total of 45 pages of reading. Implementing this paper’s recommendation would add a five page or less synopsis of the research presented here, detailing the grand strategy of the Open Door.

Further, the C200 course author should specifically relook the Yarger reading *Art Lykke and the Army War College* (reading C202-A). In this article, the author describes grand strategy as a term that is interchangeable with the NSS. A more accurate depiction of grand strategy and its place in the spectrum of the National Security Process is Yarger's later work *The Little Book of Big Strategy*. In this 2006 work Yarger presents grand strategy as separate from the NSS, occupying a place in the National Security Process that is superior to the NSS and second only to national interests. At a minimum, the CGSOC curriculum should be updated to reflect Yarger's later thinking on the subject of grand strategy— this paper, as well as Yarger's own works, has definitely established that the National Security Strategy is not the same as U.S. grand strategy.

Finally, the assessment plan for the overall C200 block, which is based on the classroom participation of individual students, is not affected by this recommendation.

Inserting a discussion of grand strategy in the C202 class of the C200 block in the ILE Common Core is a sound choice. Defining grand strategy and identifying U.S. grand strategy and its links to national purpose and U.S. policy decisions complements current instruction, it provides a beginning point that the current C202 class does not. Further, this addition to the current course is so focused in scope that it does not necessitate an increase in class time.

This recommendation is not only doctrinally sound, it is economically sound. The slight modifications to the C200 block, as demonstrated, require only minor changes to that specific class, and the effect that this recommendation has on other classes is to reinforce teaching points, not contradict. The materials recommended, excerpts from this paper and H. Richard Yarger's *Little Book of Big Strategy* are already freely available.

The additional material presented to students is equal to one more article, less than two single-spaced pages total. Finally, because the recommended changes are so focused, and only compliment existing course standards, changing C200 to include a discussion of grand strategy does not alter the current assessment plan of the course. In every way this recommendation is a low-cost, value-added proposal.

GLOSSARY

AFRICOM. United States Africa Command. One of six Combatant Commands in the U.S. Department of Defense. AFRICOM activated on 1 October 2008. Its geographic area of responsibility is Africa.

Grand strategy. Grand strategy is the combination of national purpose and interests that uses all elements of a nation's power to bring about more advantageous future conditions for that nation.

Hegemon. Leadership or predominant influence exercised by one nation over others, as in a confederation. (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Hegemony>)

Hyperpower. Term coined by Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine of France, 15 Feb. 1999. "[He] says that he now defines the United States as a 'hyperpower,' a new term that he thinks best describes 'a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories.'" *International Herald Tribune*, 15 February 1999. http://www.ihf.com/articles/1999/02/05/france.t_0.php (1 November 2008).

Instruments of power. The tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography and national will. Classified as Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (JP 1).

Interests. U.S. interests are defined two ways: geographically--the Middle East, Europe, etc.—and in three functional areas: international security, international economics, and global problems and opportunities. Interests are further prioritized as “vital”, “important” or “beneficial” (CSIS, xi).

Liberal Democratic. A school of political thought that stresses legitimacy in politics (7).

Liberal Internationalist. Liberal internationalists believe that the United States should pursue its security goals by promoting a liberal world order (7).

Liberal Utopianism. Political school of thought that stresses peace through interconnectedness. Comes in two variants, liberal peace theory and democratic peace theory. Liberal peace theory holds that the world can become so interconnected that war is impractical. Liberal democratic peace theory holds that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another (8).

NSS. National Security Strategy. Yearly report, given by the President to Congress, stating the President's overall strategic view point. Mandated by the National Security Act of 1947 and reinforced by a rider to Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 (1).

Quadrennial Defense Review. A comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other

elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States (HR 3230 sec 921).

Realism. School of political thought that stresses the dynamics of fear and power in the international system (9).

Regional Hegemon. A nation that exercises leadership or dominance over its regional neighbors.

Strategy. The science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and operations.
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Strategy> (1 November 2008).

Superpower. An extremely powerful nation, esp. one capable of influencing international events and the acts and policies of less powerful nations.
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Superpower> (1 November 2008).

Vital Interests. Those interests that are, in the U.S. view, “of such consequence that The United States should be prepared to promote them unilaterally by whatever means necessary” (CSIS, xi).

APPENDIX A

Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad during the period of Neutrality, 1793-1823¹⁵⁹

During the period of Neutrality, 1793-1820, this appendix lists 17 separate uses of armed force abroad by the United States. None of these actions were classified as diplomatic in nature. Eight times during the period 1793-1820, the use of armed force abroad was of a distinctly military nature, including two wars with foreign powers (the Undeclared Naval War with France and the War of 1812). Of the two wars fought during the period of Neutrality, both were caused by economic conflicts. The remaining 9 instances of use of United States armed forces abroad during this period were distinctly economic in nature, protecting U.S. shipping or other interests.

Therefore, of the 17 times U.S. armed forces were employed abroad during the period of Neutrality, the majority were to protect U.S. economic interests, with a raw total of 9 economic missions compared to 8 military missions, for a slim margin in favor of economic interests. If one concedes that the Undeclared Naval War with France and the War of 1812 were both economic conflicts, then the adjusted total is 11 economic missions to 6 military missions, for a ratio of almost two to one.

The actions in each period are classified as being primarily diplomatic, military or economic based on the narrative of the event provided in the original CRS report. The definitions used to classify these actions are explained below.

¹⁵⁹ Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad 1798-2004*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 2-4.

Diplomatic (D) In the instances where the description specifically stated a diplomatic task, such as guarding or escorting an ambassador, raising or lowering the U.S. flag, restoring order or providing government, the action is considered diplomatic in nature.

Economic (E) Where the event description listed the action as protecting U.S. interests, preserving property, avenging insults to U.S. shipping, or similar security-oriented duties, the event is economic in nature.

Military (M) In instances where the mission is the occupation or seizure of terrain or engaging in combat with the military of another nation-state, or the participation in a declared war, the event is considered military in nature.

Unknown (Unk) In instances where the description is too vague or otherwise lacks sufficient context to make an accurate classification, such as “to avenge the murder of a seaman” the event is classified as unknown.

Dates	Action	Description	Type (D/M/E)
1798-1800	<i>Undeclared Naval War with France</i>	This contest included land actions, such as that in the Dominican Republic, city of Puerto Plata, where marines captured a French privateer under the guns of the forts. Congress authorized military action through a series of statutes.	M
1801-05	<i>Tripoli</i>	The First Barbary War included the USS <i>George Washington</i> and USS <i>Philadelphia</i> affairs and the Eaton expedition, during which a few marines landed with United States Agent William Eaton to raise a force against Tripoli in an effort to free the crew of the <i>Philadelphia</i> . Tripoli declared war but not the United States, although Congress authorized US military action by statute.	E

1806	Mexico (Spanish territory)	Capt. Z. M. Pike, with a platoon of troops, invaded Spanish territory at the headwaters of the Rio Grande on orders from Gen. James Wilkinson. He was made prisoner without resistance at a fort he constructed in present day Colorado, taken to Mexico, and later released after seizure of his papers.	M
1806-10	<i>West Florida (Spanish territory)</i>	Gov. Claiborne of Louisiana, on orders of the President, occupied with troops territory in dispute east of the Mississippi as far as the Pearl River, later the eastern boundary of Louisiana. He was authorized to seize as far east as the Perdido River.	M
1812	<i>Amelia Island and other parts of east Florida, then under Spain</i>	Temporary possession was authorized by President Madison and by Congress, to prevent occupation by any other power; but possession was obtained by Gen. George Matthews in so irregular a manner that his measures were disavowed by the President.	M
1812-15	War of 1812	On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Among the issues leading to the war were British interception of neutral ships and blockades of the United States during British hostilities with France.	M
1813	<i>West Florida (Spanish territory)</i>	On authority given by Congress, General Wilkinson seized Mobile Bay in April with 600 soldiers. A small Spanish garrison gave way. Thus the US advanced into disputed territory to the Perdido River, as projected in 1810. No fighting.	M
1813-14	<i>Marguesas Islands</i>	US forces built a fort on the island of Nukahiva to protect three prize ships which had been captured from the British.	E
1814	<i>Spanish Florida</i>	Gen. Andrew Jackson took Pensacola and drove out the British with whom the United States was at war.	M

1814-25	<i>Caribbean</i>	Engagements between pirates and American ships or squadrons took place repeatedly, especially ashore and offshore about Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Yucatan. Three thousand pirate attacks on merchantmen were reported between 1815 and 1823. In 1822 Commodore James Biddle employed a squadron of two frigates, four sloops of war, two brigs, four schooners, and two gunboats in the West Indies.	E
1815	<i>Algiers</i>	The second Barbary War was declared against the United States by the Dey of Algiers of the Barbary states, an act not reciprocated by the United States. Congress did authorize a military expedition by statutes. A large fleet under Decatur attacked Algiers and obtained indemnities.	E
1815	<i>Tripoli</i>	After securing an agreement from Algiers, Decatur demonstrated with his squadron at Tunis and Tripoli, where he secured indemnities for offenses during the War of 1812.	E
1816	<i>Spanish Florida</i>	United States forces destroyed Nicholls Fort, called also Negro Fort, which harbored raiders making forays into United States territory.	E
1816-18	<i>Spanish Florida-First Seminole War</i>	The Seminole Indians, whose area was a haven for escaped slaves and border ruffians, were attacked by troops under Generals Jackson and Gaines and pursued into northern Florida. Spanish posts were attacked and occupied; British citizens were executed. In 1819 the Floridas were ceded to the United States.	E
1817	<i>Amelia Island (Spanish territory off Florida)</i>	Under orders of President Monroe, United States forces landed and expelled a group of smugglers, adventurers, and freebooters.	E
1818	<i>Oregon</i>	The USS <i>Ontario</i> dispatched from Washington, landed at the Columbia River and in August took possession of Oregon territory. Britain had conceded sovereignty but Russia and Spain asserted claims to the area.	E
1820-23	<i>Africa</i>	Naval units raided the slave traffic pursuant to the 1819 act of Congress.	M

APPENDIX B

Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad during the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1917¹⁶⁰

During the period of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1917, U.S. armed forces were employed abroad in 116 separate instances, not counting the American Civil War. Of those 116 instances of use of force abroad, 23 were diplomatic in nature, 9 were purely military in nature, including foreign 2 wars (the Mexican-American and Spanish-American). During the same period, U.S. armed forces were employed to protect economic interests 75 times. Additionally, this table lists 8 instances of the use of U.S. armed forces abroad where the description is too vague to classify.

This data is the longest data set- spanning almost 100 years. During that time, the use of the U.S. armed forces abroad was overwhelmingly to protect economic interests, by a margin of 3:1 over diplomatic missions and over 8:1 compared to military missions.

The actions in each period are classified as being primarily diplomatic, military or economic based on the narrative of the event provided in the original CRS report. The definitions used to classify these actions are explained below.

Diplomatic (D) In the instances where the description specifically stated a diplomatic task, such as guarding or escorting an ambassador, raising or lowering the U.S. flag, restoring order or providing government, the action is considered diplomatic in nature.

¹⁶⁰ Grimmett, Richard F. *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad 1798-2004*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 5-11.

Economic (E) Where the event description listed the action as protecting U.S. interests, preserving property, avenging insults to U.S. shipping, or similar security-oriented duties, the event is economic in nature.

Military (M) In instances where the mission is the occupation or seizure of terrain or engaging in combat with the military of another nation-state, or the participation in a declared war, the event is considered military in nature.

Unknown (Unk) In instances where the description is too vague or otherwise lacks sufficient context to make an accurate classification, such as “to avenge the murder of a seaman” the event is classified as unknown.

Date	Action	Description	Type (D/M/E)
1823	<i>Cuba</i>	Brief landings in pursuit of pirates occurred April 8 near Escondido; April 16 near Cayo Blanco; July 11 at Siquapa Bay; July 21 at Cape Cruz; and October 23 at Camrioca.	E
1824	<i>Cuba</i>	In October the USS <i>Porpoise</i> landed bluejackets near Matanzas in pursuit of pirates. This was during the cruise authorized in 1822.	E
1824	<i>Puerto Rico (Spanish territory)</i>	Commodore David Porter with a landing party attacked the town of Fajardo which had sheltered pirates and insulted American naval officers. He landed 200 men and forced an apology. Commodore Porter was later court-martialed for overstepping his powers.	E
1825	<i>Cuba</i>	In March cooperating American and British forces landed at Sagua La Grande to capture pirates.	E
1827	<i>Greece</i>	In October and November landing parties hunted pirates on the islands of Argenteire, Miconi, and Androse.	E
1831-32	<i>Falkland Islands</i>	Captain Duncan of the USS <i>Lexington</i> investigated the capture of three American sealing vessels and sought to protect American interests.	E

1832	<i>Sumatra</i>	February 6 to 9. A naval force landed and stormed a fort to punish natives of the town of Quallah Battoo for plundering the American ship <i>Friendship</i> .	E
1833	<i>Argentina</i>	October 31 to November 15. A force was sent ashore at Buenos Aires to protect the interests of the United States and other countries during an insurrection.	E
1835-36	<i>Peru</i>	December 10, 1835, to January 24, 1836, and August 31 to December 7, 1836. Marines protected American interests in Callao and Lima during an attempted revolution.	E
1838-39	<i>Sumatra</i>	December 24, 1838, to January 4, 1839. A naval force landed to punish natives of the towns of Quallah Battoo and Muckie (Mukki) for depredations on American shipping.	E
1840	<i>Fiji Islands</i>	July. Naval forces landed to punish natives for attacking American exploring and surveying parties.	E
1841	<i>Drummond Island, Kingsmill Group</i>	A naval party landed to avenge the murder of a seaman by the natives.	Unk
1841	<i>Samoa</i>	February 24. A naval party landed and burned towns after the murder of an American seaman on Upolu Island.	Unk
1842	<i>Mexico</i>	Commodore T.A.C. Jones, in command of a squadron long cruising off California, occupied Monterey, Calif., on October 19, believing war had come. He discovered peace, withdrew, and saluted. A similar incident occurred a week later at San Diego.	M
1843	<i>China</i>	Sailors and marines from the <i>St. Louis</i> were landed after a clash between Americans and Chinese at the trading post in Canton.	E
1843	<i>Africa</i>	November 29 to December 16. Four United States vessels demonstrated and landed various parties (one of 200 marines and sailors) to discourage piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory coast, and to punish attacks by the natives on American seamen and shipping.	E
1844	<i>Mexico</i>	President Tyler deployed US forces to protect Texas against Mexico, pending Senate approval of a treaty of annexation. (Later rejected.) He defended his action against a Senate resolution of inquiry.	M

1846-48	Mexican War.	On May 13, 1846, the United States recognized the existence of a state of war with Mexico. After the annexation of Texas in 1845, the United States and Mexico failed to resolve a boundary dispute and President Polk said that it was necessary to deploy forces in Mexico to meet a threatened invasion.	M
1849	<i>Smyrna</i>	In July a naval force gained release of an American seized by Austrian officials.	D
1851	<i>Turkey</i>	After a massacre of foreigners (including Americans) at Jaffa in January, a demonstration by the Mediterranean Squadron was ordered along the Turkish (Levant) coast.	M
1851	<i>Johanns Island (east of Africa)</i>	August. Forces from the US sloop of war <i>Dale</i> exacted redress for the unlawful imprisonment of the captain of an American whaling brig.	E
1852-53	<i>Argentina</i>	February 3 to 12, 1852; September 17, 1852 to April 1853. Marines were landed and maintained in Buenos Aires to protect American interests during a revolution.	E
1853	<i>Nicaragua</i>	March 11 to 13. US forces landed to protect American lives and interests during political disturbances.	E
1853-54	<i>Japan</i>	Commodore Perry and his expedition made a display of force leading to the "opening of Japan."	E
1853-54	<i>Ryukyu and Bonin Islands</i>	Commodore Perry on three visits before going to Japan and while waiting for a reply from Japan made a naval demonstration, landing marines twice, and secured a coaling concession from the ruler of Naha on Okinawa; he also demonstrated in the Bonin Islands with the purpose of securing facilities for commerce.	E
1854	<i>China</i>	April 4 to June 15 to 17. American and English ships landed forces to protect American interests in and near Shanghai during Chinese civil strife.	E
1854	<i>Nicaragua</i>	July 9 to 15. Naval forces bombarded and burned San Juan del Norte (Greytown) to avenge an insult to the American Minister to Nicaragua.	D
1855	<i>China</i>	May 19 to 21. US forces protected American interests in Shanghai and, from August 3 to 5 fought pirates near Hong Kong.	E
1855	<i>Fiji Islands</i>	September 12 to November 4. An American naval force landed to seek reparations for depredations on American residents and seamen.	E

1855	<i>Uruguay</i>	November 25 to 29. United States and European naval forces landed to protect American interests during an attempted revolution in Montevideo.	E
1856	<i>Panama, Republic of New Grenada</i>	September 19 to 22. US forces landed to protect American interests during an insurrection.	E
1856	<i>China</i>	October 22 to December 6. US forces landed to protect American interests at Canton during hostilities between the British and the Chinese, and to avenge an assault upon an unarmed boat displaying the United States flag.	E
1857	<i>Nicaragua</i>	April to May, November to December. In May Commander C.H. Davis of the United States Navy, with some marines, received the surrender of William Walker, who had been attempting to get control of the country, and protected his men from the retaliation of native allies who had been fighting Walker. In November and December of the same year United States vessels <i>Saratoga</i> , <i>Wabash</i> , and <i>Fulton</i> opposed another attempt of William Walker on Nicaragua. Commodore Hiram Paulding's act of landing marines and compelling the removal of Walker to the United States was tacitly disavowed by Secretary of State Lewis Cass, and Paulding was forced into retirement.	D
1858	<i>Uruguay</i>	January 2 to 27. Forces from two United States warships landed to protect American property during a revolution in Montevideo.	E
1858	<i>Fiji Islands</i>	October 6 to 16. A marine expedition chastised natives for the murder of two American citizens at Waya.	Unk
1858-59	<i>Turkey</i>	The Secretary of State requested a display of naval force along the Levant after a massacre of Americans at Jaffa and mistreatment elsewhere "to remind the authorities (of Turkey) of the power of the United States."	M
1859	<i>Paraguay</i>	Congress authorized a naval squadron to seek redress for an attack on a naval vessel in the Parana River during 1855. Apologies were made after a large display of force.	E
1859	<i>Mexico</i>	Two hundred United States soldiers crossed the Rio Grande in pursuit of the Mexican bandit Cortina.	M
1859	<i>China</i>	July 31 to August 2. A naval force landed to protect American interests in Shanghai.	E

1860	<i>Angola, Portuguese West Africa</i>	March 1. American residents at Kissembo called upon American and British ships to protect lives and property during problems with natives.	E
1860	<i>Colombia, Bay of Panama</i>	September 27 to October 8. Naval forces landed to protect American interests during a revolution.	E
1863	<i>Japan</i>	July 16. The USS <i>Wyoming</i> retaliated against a firing on the American vessel <i>Pembroke</i> at Shimonoseki.	M
1864	<i>Japan</i>	July 14 to August 3. Naval forces protected the United States Minister to Japan when he visited Yedo to negotiate concerning some American claims against Japan, and to make his negotiations easier by impressing the Japanese with American power.	D
1864	<i>Japan</i>	September 4 to 14. Naval forces of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands compelled Japan and the Prince of Nagato in particular to permit the Straits of Shimonoseki to be used by foreign shipping in accordance with treaties already signed.	D
1865	<i>Panama</i>	March 9 and 10. US forces protected the lives and property of American residents during a revolution.	E
1866	<i>Mexico</i>	To protect American residents, General Sedgwick and 100 men obtained surrender of Matamoras. After three days he was ordered by US Government to withdraw. His act was repudiated by the President.	E
1866	<i>China</i>	From June 20 to July 7, US forces punished an assault on the American consul at Newchwang	D
1867	<i>Nicaragua</i>	Marines occupied Managua and Leon.	Unk
1867	<i>Formosa</i>	June 13. A naval force landed and burned a number of huts to punish the murder of the crew of a wrecked American vessel.	E
1868	<i>Japan (Osaka, Hiogo, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Negata)</i>	February 4 to 8, April 4 to May 12, June 12 and 13. US forces were landed to protect American interests during the civil war in Japan.	E
1868	<i>Uruguay</i>	February 7 and 8, 19 to 26. US forces protected foreign residents and the customhouse during an insurrection at Montevideo.	E

1868	<i>Colombia</i>	April. US forces protected passengers and treasure in transit at Aspinwall during the absence of local police or troops on the occasion of the death of the President of Colombia.	E
1870	<i>Mexico</i>	June 17 and 18. US forces destroyed the pirate ship <i>Forward</i> , which had been run aground about 40 miles up the Rio Tecapan.	E
1870	<i>Hawaiian Islands</i>	September 21. US forces placed the American flag at half mast upon the death of Queen Kalama, when the American consul at Honolulu would not assume responsibility for so doing.	D
1871	<i>Korea</i>	June 10 to 12. A US naval force attacked and captured five forts to punish natives for depredations on Americans, particularly for murdering the crew of the <i>General Sherman</i> and burning the schooner, and for later firing on other American small boats taking soundings up the Salee River.	E
1873	<i>Colombia (Bay of Panama)</i>	May 7 to 22, September 23 to October 9. U.S. forces protected American interests during hostilities between local groups over control of the government of the State of Panama.	D
1873-96	<i>Mexico</i>	May 18. An American force was landed to police the town of Matamoras temporarily while it was without other government.	D
1874	<i>Hawaiian Islands.</i>	February 12 to 20. Detachments from American vessels were landed to preserve order and protect American lives and interests during the coronation of a new king.	E
1876	<i>Mexico</i>	May 18. An American force was landed to police the town of Matamoras temporarily while it was without other government.	D
1882	<i>Egypt</i>	July 14 to 18. American forces landed to protect American interests during warfare between British and Egyptians and looting of the city of Alexandria by Arabs.	E
1885	<i>Panama (Colon)</i>	January 18 and 19. US forces were used to guard the valuables in transit over the Panama Railroad, and the safes and vaults of the company during revolutionary activity. In March, April, and May in the cities of Colon and Panama, the forces helped reestablish freedom of transit during revolutionary activity.	E

1888	<i>Korea</i>	June. A naval force was sent ashore to protect American residents in Seoul during unsettled political conditions, when an outbreak of the populace was expected.	E
1888	<i>Haiti</i>	December 20. A display of force persuaded the Haitian Government to give up an American steamer, which had been seized on the charge of breach of blockade.	E
1888-89	<i>Samoa</i>	November 14, 1888, to March 20, 1889. US forces were landed to protect American citizens and the consulate during a native civil war.	E
1889	<i>Hawaiian Islands</i>	July 30 and 31. US forces protected American interests at Honolulu during a revolution.	E
1890	<i>Argentina</i>	A naval party landed to protect US consulate and legation in Buenos Aires	D
1891	<i>Haiti</i>	US forces sought to protect American lives and property on Navassa Island.	E
1891	<i>Bering Strait</i>	July 2 to October 5. Naval forces sought to stop seal poaching.	E
1891	<i>Chile</i>	August 28 to 30. US forces protected the American consulate and the women and children who had taken refuge in it during a revolution in Valparaiso.	E
1893	<i>Hawaii</i>	January 16 to April 1. Marines were landed, ostensibly to protect American lives and property, but many believed actually to promote a provisional government under Sanford B. Dole. This action was disavowed by the United States.	E
1894	<i>Brazil</i>	January. A display of naval force sought to protect American commerce and shipping at Rio de Janeiro during a Brazilian civil war.	E
1894	<i>Nicaragua</i>	July 6 to August 7. US forces sought to protect American interests at Bluefields following a revolution.	E
1894-95	<i>China</i>	Marines were stationed at Tientsin and penetrated to Peking for protection purposes during the Sino-Japanese War.	E
1894-95	<i>China</i>	A naval vessel was beached and used as a fort at Newchwang for protection of American nationals.	Unk
1894-96	<i>Korea</i>	July 24, 1894 to April 3, 1896. A guard of marines was sent to protect the American legation and American lives and interests at Seoul during and following the Sino-Japanese War.	E

1895	<i>Colombia</i>	March 8 to 9. US forces protected American interests during an attack on the town of Bocas del Toro by a bandit chieftain.	E
1896	<i>Nicaragua</i>	May 2 to 4. US forces protected American interests in Corinto during political unrest.	E
1898	<i>Nicaragua</i>	February 7 and 8. US forces protected American lives and property at San Juan del Sur.	E
1898	The Spanish-American War	On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war with Spain. The war followed a Cuban insurrection against Spanish rule and the sinking of the USS <i>Maine</i> in the harbor at Havana.	M
1898-99	<i>China</i>	November 5, 1898 to March 15, 1899. US forces provided a guard for the legation at Peking and the consulate at Tientsin during the contest between the Dowager Empress and her son.	Unk
1899	<i>Nicaragua</i>	American and British naval forces were landed to protect national interests at San Juan del Norte, February 22 to March 5, and at Bluefields a few weeks later in connection with the insurrection of Gen. Juan P. Reyes.	E
1899	<i>Samoa</i>	February-May 15. American and British naval forces were landed to protect national interests and to take part in a bloody contention over the succession to the throne.	E
1899-1901	<i>Philippine Islands</i>	US forces protected American interests following the war with Spain and conquered the islands by defeating the Filipinos in their war for independence.	E
1900	<i>China</i>	May 24 to September 28. American troops participated in operations to protect foreign lives during the Boxer rising, particularly at Peking. For many years after this experience a permanent legation guard was maintained in Peking, and was strengthened at times when trouble threatened.	E
1901	<i>Colombia (State of Panama)</i>	November 20 to December 4. US forces protected American property on the Isthmus and kept transit lines open during serious revolutionary disturbances.	E
1902	<i>Colombia</i>	April 16 to 23. US forces protected American lives and property at Bocas del Toro during a civil war.	E
1902	<i>Colombia (State of Panama).</i>	September 17 to November 18. The US placed armed guards on all trains crossing the Isthmus to keep the railroad line open, and stationed ships on both sides of Panama to prevent the landing of Colombian troops.	E

1903	<i>Honduras</i>	March 23 to 30 or 31. US forces protected the American consulate and the steamship wharf at Puerto Cortez during a period of revolutionary activity.	E
1903	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	March 30 to April 21. A detachment of marines was landed to protect American interests in the city of Santo Domingo during a revolutionary outbreak.	E
1903	<i>Syria</i>	September 7 to 12. US forces protected the American consulate in Beirut when a local Moslem uprising was feared.	D
1903-04	<i>Abyssinia</i>	Twenty-five marines were sent to Abyssinia to protect the US Consul General while he negotiated a treaty.	D
1903-14	<i>Panama</i>	US forces sought to protect American interests and lives during and following the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmian Canal. With brief intermissions, United States Marines were stationed on the Isthmus from November 4, 1903 to January 21, 1914 to guard American interests.	E
1904	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	January 2 to February 11. American and British naval forces established an area in which no fighting would be allowed and protected American interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and Santo Domingo City during revolutionary fighting.	D
1904	<i>Tangier, Morocco</i>	"We want either Perdicaris alive or Raisula dead." A squadron demonstrated to force release of a kidnapped American. Marines were landed to protect the consul general.	D
1904	<i>Panama</i>	November 17 to 24. US forces protected American lives and property at Ancon at the time of a threatened insurrection.	E
1904-05	<i>Korea</i>	January 5, 1904, to November 11, 1905. A guard of Marines was sent to protect the American legation in Seoul during the Russo-Japanese War.	D
1906-09	<i>Cuba</i>	September 1906 to January 23, 1909. US forces sought to restore order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government after serious revolutionary activity.	D
1907	<i>Honduras</i>	March 18 to June 8. To protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua, troops were stationed in Trujillo, Ceiba, Puerto Cortez, San Pedro, Laguna and Choloma.	E
1910	<i>Nicaragua</i>	May 19 to September 4. US forces protected American interests at Bluefields.	E

1911	<i>Honduras</i>	January 26. American naval detachments were landed to protect American lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras.	E
1911	<i>China</i>	As the nationalist revolution approached, in October an ensign and 10 men tried to enter Wuchang to rescue missionaries but retired on being warned away, and a small landing force guarded American private property and the consulate at Hankow. Marines were deployed in November to guard the cable stations at Shanghai; landing forces were sent for protection in Nanking, Chinkiang, Taku and elsewhere.	D
1912	<i>Honduras</i>	A small force landed to prevent seizure by the government of an American-owned railroad at Puerto Cortez. The forces were withdrawn after the United States disapproved the action.	M
1912	<i>Panama</i>	Troops, on request of both political parties, supervised elections outside the Canal Zone.	D
1912	<i>Cuba</i>	June 5 to August 5. US forces protected American interests on the Province of Oriente, and in Havana.	E
1912	<i>China</i>	August 24 to 26 on Kentucky Island and August 26 to 30 at Camp Nicholson. US forces protected Americans and American interests during revolutionary activity.	E
1912	<i>Turkey</i>	November 18 to December 3. US forces guarded the American legation at Constantinople during a Balkan War	D
1912-25	<i>Nicaragua</i>	August to November 1912. US forces protected American interests during an attempted revolution. A small force, serving as a legation guard and seeking to promote peace and stability, remained until August 5, 1925.	E
1912-41	<i>China</i>	The disorders which began with the overthrow of the dynasty during Kuomintang rebellion in 1912, which were redirected by the invasion of China by Japan, led to demonstrations and landing parties for the protection of US interests in China continuously and at many points from 1912 through 1941. The guard at Peking and along the route to the sea was maintained until 1941. In 1927, the United States had 5,670 troops ashore in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters. In 1933 the United States had 3,027 armed men ashore. The protective action was generally based on treaties with China concluded from 1858 to 1901.	E

1913	<i>Mexico</i>	September 5 to 7. A few marines landed at Ciaris Estero to aid in evacuating American citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made dangerous for foreigners by civil strife.	D
1914	<i>Haiti</i>	January 29 to February 9, February 20 to 21, October 19. Intermittently US naval forces protected American nationals in a time of rioting and revolution.	E
1914	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	June and July. During a revolutionary movement, United States naval forces by gunfire stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata, and by threat of force maintained Santo Domingo City as a neutral zone.	D
1914-17	<i>Mexico</i>	Undeclared Mexican--American hostilities followed the <i>Dolphin</i> affair and Villa's raids and included capture of Vera Cruz and later Pershing's expedition into northern Mexico.	E
1915-34	<i>Haiti</i>	July 28, 1915, to August 15, 1934. US forces maintained order during chronic political instability.	D
1916	<i>China</i>	American forces landed to quell a riot taking place on American property in Nanking.	Unk
1916-24	<i>Dominican Republic</i>	May 1916 to September 1924. American naval forces maintained order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.	Unk
1917	<i>China</i>	American troops were landed at Chungking to protect American lives during a political crisis	E

APPENDIX C

Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad during the period 1917-1941 (excluding U.S. entry into World War II)¹⁶¹

During the Wilsonian period, 1917-1941, U.S. armed forces were used abroad on 29 separate occasions. The table shows 5 diplomatic missions during the period. There were 9 actions of a purely military nature, including U.S. participation in World War I and the escort patrols of U.S. shipping in the Atlantic in the months immediately prior to U.S. entry into World War II.¹⁶² During the same time frame, 13 missions were classified as economic in nature, with an additional two missions classified as unknown.

This pattern reinforces the data from earlier periods. The U.S. of armed force abroad by the United States during the period 1917-1941 was primarily economic, although the results are not as skewed as those from the period of the Monroe Doctrine, in which economic missions overshadowed military ones by a margin of 3:1.

The actions in each period are classified as being primarily diplomatic, military or economic based on the narrative of the event provided in the original CRS report. The definitions used to classify these actions are explained below.

Diplomatic (D) In the instances where the description specifically stated a diplomatic task, such as guarding or escorting an ambassador, raising or lowering the

¹⁶¹ Grimmett, Richard F. *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad 1798-2004*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 12-15.

¹⁶² One could argue that escorting U.S. shipping bound for England in 1941 was an economic action. On the surface, those actions meet every criteria for a economic mission; however consideration is given to the fact that lend-lease materials and other wartime goods bound for Britain in 1941 were de facto military in nature, the conscious decision of the U.S. government to aid a belligerent party in war.

U.S. flag, restoring order or providing government, the action is considered diplomatic in nature.

Economic (E) Where the event description listed the action as protecting U.S. interests, preserving property, avenging insults to U.S. shipping, or similar security-oriented duties, the event is economic in nature.

Military (M) In instances where the mission is the occupation or seizure of terrain or engaging in combat with the military of another nation-state, or the participation in a declared war, the event is considered military in nature.

Unknown (Unk) In instances where the description is too vague or otherwise lacks sufficient context to make an accurate classification, such as “to avenge the murder of a seaman” the event is classified as unknown.

Date	Action	Description	Type (D/M/E)
1917-18	World War I	On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war with Germany and on December 7, 1917, with Austria-Hungary. Entrance of the United States into the war was precipitated by Germany's submarine warfare against neutral shipping.	M
1917-22	<i>Cuba</i>	US forces protected American interests during insurrection and subsequent unsettled conditions. Most of the United States armed forces left Cuba by August 1919, but two companies remained at Camaguey until February 1922.	E
1918-19	<i>Mexico</i>	After withdrawal of the Pershing expedition, US troops entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits at least three times in 1918 and six times in 1919. In August 1918 American and Mexican troops fought at Nogales.	M
1918-20	<i>Panama</i>	US forces were used for police duty according to treaty stipulations, at Chiriqui during election disturbances and subsequent unrest.	D

1918-20	<i>Soviet Russia</i>	Marines were landed at and near Vladivostok in June and July to protect the American consulate and other points in the fighting between the Bolshevik troops and the Czech Army, which had traversed Siberia from the western front. The American, Japanese, British, French and Czech commanders issued a joint proclamation of emergency government and neutrality in July. In August 7,000 men were landed in Vladivostok and remained until January 1920, as part of an allied occupation force. In September 1918, 5,000 American troops joined the allied intervention force at Archangel and remained until June 1919. These operations were in response to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and were partly supported by Czarist or Kerensky elements.	D
1919	<i>Dalmatia</i>	US forces were landed at Trau at the request of Italian authorities to police order between the Italians and Serbs.	M
1919	<i>Turkey</i>	Marines from the USS <i>Arizona</i> were landed to guard the US Consulate during the Greek occupation of Constantinople.	D
1920	<i>China</i>	March 14. A landing force was sent ashore for a few hours to protect lives during a disturbance at Kiukiang.	Unk
1920	<i>Guatemala</i>	April 9 to 27. US forces protected the American Legation and other American interests, such as the cable station, during a period of fighting between Unionists and the Government of Guatemala.	E
1920-22	<i>Russia (Siberia)</i>	February 16, 1920, to November 19, 1922. A Marine guard was sent to protect the United States radio station and property on Russian Island, Bay of Vladivostok.	E
1921	<i>Panama - Costa Rica</i>	American naval squadrons demonstrated in April on both sides of the Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a boundary dispute.	D
1922	<i>Turkey</i>	September and October. A landing force was sent ashore with consent of both Greek and Turkish authorities, to protect American lives and property when the Turkish Nationalists entered Smyrna.	E
1922-23	<i>China</i>	Between April 1922 and November 1923 Marines were landed five times to protect Americans during periods of unrest.	E

1924	<i>Honduras</i>	February 28 to March 31, September 10 to 15. US forces protected American lives and interests during election hostilities.	E
1924	<i>China</i>	September. Marines were landed to protect Americans and other foreigners in Shanghai during Chinese factional hostilities.	Unk
1925	<i>China</i>	January 15 to August 29. Fighting of Chinese factions, accompanied by riots and demonstrations in Shanghai, brought the landing of American forces to protect lives and property in the International Settlement.	E
1925	<i>Honduras</i>	April 19 to 21. US forces protected foreigners at La Ceiba during a political upheaval.	E
1925	<i>Panama</i>	October 12 to 23. Strikes and rent riots led to the landing of about 600 American troops to keep order and protect American interests.	E
1926-33	<i>Nicaragua</i>	May 7 to June 5, 1926; August 27, 1926 to January 3, 1933. The coup d'etat of General Chamorro aroused revolutionary activities leading to the landing of American marines to protect the interests of the United States. United States forces came and went intermittently until January 3, 1933.	E
1926	<i>China</i>	August and September. The Nationalist attack on Hankow brought the landing of American naval forces to protect American citizens. A small guard was maintained at the consulate general even after September 16, when the rest of the forces were withdrawn. Likewise, when Nationalist forces captured Kiukiang, naval forces were landed for the protection of foreigners November 4 to 6.	E
1927	<i>China</i>	February. Fighting at Shanghai caused American naval forces and marines to be increased. In March a naval guard was stationed at American consulate at Nanking after Nationalist forces captured the city. American and British destroyers later used shell fire to protect Americans and other foreigners. Subsequently additional forces of marines and naval forces were stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai and Tientsin.	M
1932	<i>China</i>	American forces were landed to protect American interests during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai.	E

1933	<i>Cuba</i>	During a revolution against President Gerardo Machado naval forces demonstrated but no landing was made.	M
1934	<i>China</i>	Marines landed at Foochow to protect the American Consulate.	D
1940	<i>Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, - Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana</i>	Troops were sent to guard air and naval bases obtained by negotiation with Great Britain. These were sometimes called lend-lease bases.	M
1941	<i>Greenland</i>	Greenland was taken under protection of the United States in April.	M
1941	<i>Netherlands (Dutch Guiana)</i>	In November the President ordered American troops to occupy Dutch Guiana, but by agreement with the Netherlands government in exile, Brazil cooperated to protect aluminum ore supply from the bauxite mines in Surinam.	E
1941	<i>Iceland</i>	Iceland was taken under the protection of the United States, with consent of its government, for strategic reasons.	M
1941	<i>Germany</i>	Sometime in the spring the President ordered the Navy to patrol ship lanes to Europe. By July US warships were convoying and by September were attacking German submarines. In November, the Neutrality Act was partly repealed to protect US military aid to Britain.	M

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